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Pennoyer v. Neff' needs no introduction. The decision has received extensive
treatment in the legal literature and has been an integral part of the "initiation
rites" for generations of law students. For the most part, both the scholarly com-
mentaries and the student comments have been critical, and the doctrinal under-
pinnings of Pennoyer have been subject to some attack in the "real world" of
judicial decisions as well. These judicial attacks, particularly in the past, have
generally been less than direct, however. As a result, Pennoyer v. Neff remained
a major force in the American law of jurisdiction for almost one hundred years
after Justice Field penned the opinion.
The influence of Pennoyer was first significantly curtailed by the United States
Supreme Court over thirty years ago in International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash-
ington.2 That influence may have recently been brought to an abrupt and final
end. The Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner3 not only reaffirmed past modifi-
cations to the Pennoyer framework of state court jurisdiction but also expressed
doubt that the Pennoyer framework retains any measure of utility. International
Shoe was named Pennoyer's successor.
The passing of Pennoyer has been greeted with resounding cheers, and
Shaffer v. Heitner has already been enshrined as one of the landmark opinions in
the American law of state court jurisdiction. It is difficult, however, to intel-
ligently applaud the passing of the old without critically assessing the new. Shaffer
v. Heitner must be examined to determine not only what it says about Pennoyer
v. Neff but what it says about International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington as
well.
The contributions of International Shoe to the growth of the American law
of state court jurisdiction cannot be seriously questioned. The "minimum con-
tacts" test of International Shoe provided for basic change in legal theory when
change was desperately needed. It freed courts from the mechanical inquiries of
the past and compelled their consideration and discussion of factors bearing upon
fairness and justice in dealing with jurisdictional problems.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. B.A., Thiel Col-
lege, 1970; J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1973. The author wishes to express his gratitude to
Mr. Pete Skeel, a third-year law student at the University of Pittsburgh, for his research
assistance in the preparation of this article and to three of his colleagues-Professors Josiah
Blackmqre and Karl Herbst of the University of Pittsburgh and Professor Allen Kamp of the
Capital University Law School-for their willingness to discuss legal problems, including, at
least occasionally, problems of state court jurisdiction.
1 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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The 'flexibility inherent in such a standard also generated a significant
amount of uncertainty, however. Serious questions arose both as to the proper
method for the immediate application of the minimum contacts test and as to the
likely pattern for the future development of this area of the law. The level of
uncertainty was raised, rather than lowered, by the Supreme Court itself when,
in the same term, it decided McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.4 and
Hanson v. Denckla.' The opinions rendered in those cases appear to embody
fundamentally different views of the constitutional restraints on state court
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.
Shaffer and the even more recent opinion in Kulka v. Superior Court of
California are the most important personal jurisdiction decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court since McGee and Hanson. Fortunately, these later cases are more
consistent in their approach than their two predecessors were. The message which
they bear is not one which was widely expected, however. Shaffer and Kulko
both strongly suggest that, after a century of continuous "jurisdictional growth,"
the new priority of the Supreme Court is the imposition of effective limits on state
court exercises of jurisdiction.
II. The Growth of the American Law of State Court Jurisdiction
A. Pennoyer v. Neff: Traditional Notions
The dispute giving rise to Pennoyer was not complex. Neff, a resident of
California, allegedly owed Mitchell, who was from Oregon, some $294.98.
Mitchell, an attorney, initiated an action in the circuit court of Multnomah
County, Oregon, seeking to recover that amount. The formalities of commencing
the action included the publication of notice in an Oregon newspaper. No other
preaction notice was given to Neff, although at some later time real property
which he owned within the state of Oregon was attached. Mitchell obtained a
default judgment, and the attached property was sold to Pennoyer. Neff then
brought a second action, in federal court in Oregon, naming Pennoyer as the
defendant and seeking to establish his title to the property, which he contended
was worth more than $15,000, by claiming that the judicial sale to Pennoyer
was invalid.
The legal problem facing the Supreme Court7 in Pennoyer was a straight-
forward one: Under what circumstances could the courts of a state constitu-
tionally exercise judicial power over a non-consenting, non-resident defendant?
4 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
5 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
6 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
7 The lower court in Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1279 (C.C. Ore. 1875) (No. 10,083)
had found the state court judgment to be void because of failures to comply with state statutory
provisions governing notice of the pending action. The statute in question provided for
service by publication. The defects complained of were defects in the affidavit by which the
order of publication was obtained and in the affidavit by which publication was proved. The
Supreme Court held, however, that to the extent that any such failures to comply with the
statute did exist they must be raised on appeal in the action itself and not by collateral attack
in a subsequent proceeding. 95 U.S. at 720-21.
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Justice Field's solution, displaying the influence of the writings of Joseph Story,8
was equally straightforward. In their simplest form, the basic rules emerging
from -the decision could be stated as follows:
1) The courts of a state may "directly" exercise judicial power over a
non-consenting, non-resident defendant through an in personam proceeding
only if that defendant was served with process while present in the state.
2) The courts of a state may "indirectly" exercise judicial power over
a non-consenting, non-resident defendant through an in rem proceeding only
if that defendant owns property which is present in the state and which is
subjected to the control of the court at the time of the commencement of the
action.
This seizure of property contemporaneous with the commencement of the pro-
ceeding in an in rem action is required both to insure a secure basis for jurisdic-
tion9 and as one form of notice." The property seized need not be related to the
8 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834). The influence of the
writings of Story in the development of the Pennoyer theory of jurisdiction is discussed in
numerous articles, including Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 241.
9 The want of authority of the tribunals of a State to adjudicate upon the obliga-
tions of non-residents, where they have no property within its limits, is not denied by
the court below: but the position is assumed, that, where they have property within the
State, it is immaterial whether the property is in the first instance brought under the
control of the court by attachment or some other equivalent act, and afterwards
applied by its judgment to the satisfaction of demands against its owner; or such
demands be first established in a personal action, and the property of the non-resident
be afterwards seized and sold on execution. But the answer to this position has
already been given in the statement, that the jurisdiction of the court to inquire into
and determine his obligations at all is only incidental to its jurisdiction over the
property. Its jurisdiction in that respect cannot be made to depend upon facts to be
ascertained after it has tried the cause and rendered the judgment. If the judgment
be previously void, it will not become valid by the subsequent discovery of property
of the defendants or by his subsequent acquisition of it. The judgment, if void
when rendered, will always remain void: it cannot occupy the doubtful position of
being valid if property be found, and void if there be none.
95 U.S. at 727-28.
10 The notice-giving function was grounded in the premise that an owner of property is
always in possession of that property. Therefore, if the property is seized to commence a law-
suit, the owner has necessarily received notice of the action.
With respect to this question, the Supreme Court reached a decision which clashed
directly with what had been decided in the court below. The circuit court stated: "Nor does
it appear to me that the state is bound in any case to provide for giving notice to the absent
party by publication of the summons or otherwise. That matter pertains to the mode of
proceeding over which the state has absolute control." 17 F. Cas. at 1281-82. Both the Supreme
Court's opinion in Pennoyer and later opinions by that Court have made it clear that there are
federal constitutional dimensions to the problem of giving notice.
With respect to the specific requirement that.property be seized at the commencement of
an in rem action, the circuit court had misgivings about preaction seizures and expressed a
preference for the procedure followed in Mitchell v. Neff, where the property was not seized
until later in the proceeding. In the words of the court, this later seizure was more desirable
because "it does not permit the seizure or interference with the property of the non-resident until
the right or claim of the citizen in or to it is satisfactorily established." 17 F. Cas. at 1281.
Similar concerns were expressed in much more recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with
provisional remedies. See the text accompanying notes 45-48 infra.
Neff, in support of his arguments that jurisdiction was lacking in the earlier case, cited as
authority Galpin v. Page, 9 F. Cas. 1126 (C.C. Cal. 1874) (No. 5,206) a decision rendered
by Mr. Justice Field in the Circuit Court for the District of California. The circuit court here
distinguished that case before making the statements quoted above. Mr. Justice Field had the
opportunity to reassert much of what had been said in Galpin in the Supreme Court's opinion
in Pennoyer.
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plaintiff's claim,1 but the plaintiff's recovery, if any, will be limited to the value
of that property." Applying these rules to the facts of the case before it, the
Pennoyer Court found the Oregon state court judgment to be invalid because
Neff had not been personally served with process while in the state and his
property had not been seized at the commencement of the action. 3
Apart from the simplicity of these rules, there are a number of things to note
about the structure for state court jurisdiction thus created. First, according to
Justice Field, the structure has its roots in the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution.' Up to this point, the key constitutional provision as regards
questions of jurisdiction had been the full faith and credit clause of article IV.
That provision required that full faith and credit generally be given judgments
of the courts of sister states when their enforcement was sought but permitted
collateral attack upon such judgments if the rendering court lacked jurisdiction.
11 In the view of the Pennoyer Court, the presence of property within the territorial
boundaries of the forum state gave the courts of that state physical power over the property,
and nothing more-other than notice-was required for the valid exercise of jurisdiction.
Indeed, there is nothing to suggest that the property sold in Pennoyer was in any way related to
Mitchell's claim for unpaid legal fees. The sale of the property was held to be invalid because
the property had not been seized at the commencement of the action, not because of the
absence of any link between the property and the claim. The existence or nonexistence of such
a link would become more important, however, as the validity of a court's exercise of jurisdiction
came to depend less upon physical power than it did upon notions of fairness.
The existence or nonexistence of such a link will be acknowledged in this article, in part,
by the use of terms distinguishing three different types of jurisdiction. An action in personam
is an action in which the court's jurisdiction does not depend in any way upon the exercise of
control over the defendant's property. The action is prosecuted "directly" against the de-
fendant and might potentially subject him to a personal judgment in an unlimited amount.
If property is seized in an in personam action, it will most commonly be seized after a judgment
has been rendered in an effort to satisfy that judgment. An in rem action is an action in which
the court's jurisdiction does depend upon the court's exercise of control over the defendant's
property at the commencement of the action and is an action in which the property seized is
somehow related to the claim asserted by the plaintiff, usually because there is a dispute over
title to the property. An action quasi in rem is an action in which the court's jurisdiction does
depend upon the court's exercise of control over the defendant's property at the commencement
of the action but is an action in which the property seized is unrelated to the claim asserted by
the plaintiff.
It should be noted that the above definitions are not universally, or perhaps even gen-
erally, accepted. The terms are, for example, defined as follows in RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS
5-9:
A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated property. A
judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular persons in designated property.
The latter is of two types. In one the plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing
claim in the subject property and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar
interests of particular persons. In the other the plaintiff seeks to apply what he
concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of the claim against
him.
The line between in rem and quasi in rem actions is clearly not drawn at the same point. It is
submitted, however, that in terms of jurisdictional inquiry the line drawn in the above
definitions is more meaningful and less cumbersome than the line drawn in the Restatement.
Care should be taken to ascertain the precise meaning being given these terms when they are
used in judicial opinions. The definitions contained in the Restatement are the ones used by
the Shaffer Court. See notes 108 and 109 infra.
12 This limitation will always apply as regards a defaulting defendant. Whether or not
the defendant exposes himself to an unlimited personal liability by appearing and defending
an in rem or quasi in rem action is discussed in the text accompanying notes 85-90 infra.
13 Neff's property in Oregon could not have been seized at the commencement of Mitchell's
action against him because he did not own it at the time. The judgment in Mitchell v. Neff was
rendered on February 19, 1866. The patent to the property was issued to Neff on March 19,
1866, one month later. 17 F. Cas. at 1280.
14 95 U.S. at 733. It is interesting to note that the Mitchell v. Neff judgment was actually
rendered before the effective date of the fourteenth amendment.
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After Pennoyer, the same jurisdictional defects could be challenged in the courts
of the state rendering the judgment itself under the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause.15 Because the standard to be applied is one flowing from the
federal constitution, the United States Supreme Court has the power to ultimately
determine whether or not the exercise of judicial power is permissible.'
It appears from the opinion that the constitutional concerns with respect to
jurisdiction over the parties or their property are two." First, in order to preserve
each state's sovereignty, no state court should exercise power in a way which
would interfere with the exclusive dominion which another state enjoys over the
people and property found within its borders. In the view of the Pennoyer Court
the Union consisted of states exercising substantially the authority of independent
nations. In the words of the Court, "The independence of one implies the ex-
clusion from power of all others. [Therefore,] every State possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory [and]
no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory."'" Second, and in the interest of fairness, no action should
proceed without notice to the defendant, whether the action is in personam or
in rem. 9
Each of these concerns is legitimate, and each retains some measure of im-
portance today. What is most significant in terms of understanding Pennoyer and
appreciating the need for change, however, is the manner in which those con-
cerns were dealt with. One basic principle, again, is that a non-resident defendant
must receive notice of the pending action. To send such notice across state lines
would, however, be offensive to the other basic principle which embodies the
Pennoyer concept of exclusive sovereignty. The solution is a very restrictive rule
of in personam jurisdiction: the non-resident defendant must be served with
process while in the forum state. This is a rule which in its simplicity entangles
the very distinct problems of sovereignty and notice in an undesirable way.2"
15 The ability to challenge the judgment in the courts of the forum state itself is partic-
ularly important in a case like Pennoyer where the judgment could be satisfied by the sale of
property found in the state. Although the jurisdictional objections were raised via a post-
judgement collateral attack in Pennoyer, such objections, when raised in the forum state, would
ordinarily be raised through pretrial motions. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
16 Whether the jurisdictional challenge is raised in the forum state under the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause or in another state under the full faith and credit clause, the
constitutional standard is the same. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958).
17 A court must also be concerned, of course, with subject matter jurisdiction, that is, the
competency of the court to deal with the type of litigation presented in the case before it.
95 U.S. at 733. Subject matter jurisdiction posed no problems in Pennoyer.
18 95 U.S. at 722.
19 The form of notice required might traditionally vary, however, depending upon whether
the action was one in personam or one in rem (or quasi in rem). In an in rem action, as has
already been noted, property owned by the defendant is seized at the commencement of the
action. Since a property owner was presumed, under the law, to be in possession of his
property at all times, the seizure itself was one form of notice, and requirements for additional
notice might, therefore, be less stringent in in rem actions than in in personam actions. Both
the presumption referred to and the difference in notice requirements as outlined above have
since been rejected by the United States Supreme Court. See Schroeder v. City of New York,
371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); and Mullane v.
Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
20 The problem of sovereignty goes directly to the question whether the courts of a state
should have the power to act in a particular case involving particular parties. The problem
of notice, on the other hand, really arises only after there has been a determination that the
basic power to act exists and relates to the procedures by which that power may be imple-
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It is, in addition, a rule which, because of its restrictive nature, creates the
need for a safety valve of sorts. Obtaining service upon a non-resident defendant
within the forum state will often be a difficult, if not impossible, task, particularly
if the defendant perceives the possibility of litigation and intentionally stays away.
In response to this practical problem, the second half of the framework of juris-
diction is erected. If state court jurisdiction cannot be justified in terms of the
direct exercise of power over the defendant himself in an in personam action
because he cannot be found and served in the state, perhaps it can be justified in
terms of the indirect exercise of power over the defendant through the direct ex-
ercise of power over his property in an in rem action, if he has property in the
state.
This limited source of flexibility would not be enough, however. That it
would not be enough was recognized by the Pennoyer Court itself when it
identified certain categories of cases that might have to be governed by other,
presumably less restrictive, rules.2 ' The true inadequacy of the tests became more
apparent, however, only as time passed and a new century began. As society
grew and became more mobile, transactions and occurrences were spawned which
involved multi-state aspects not compatible with the doctrine of exclusive sov-
ereignty which was so central to the Pennoyer scheme.22 The traditional rules of
jurisdiction grounded in this doctrine of exclusive sovereignty became too con-
fining.
The result was accommodation. Legal fictions were created so that the needs
of the times might be met within the already aging framework of Pennoyer. The
Supreme Court provided additional, and perhaps unneeded, flexibility in terms
of "power over property" by holding in Harris v. Balk" that a debt was a form
of property which could be "seized" in order to create quasi in rem jurisdiction.24
mented.
The entangling of these problems had its roots in "the medieval English requirement that
a lawsuit could be initiated only by physically compelling the defendant to submit to the court's
jurisdiction." Developments in the Law-State Court jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909,
938 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. Actual arrest of the defendant was, of course,
no longer a prerequisite to judicial action at the time of Pennoyer and Field's justification of
his jurisdictional framework as a partial solution to the notice problem has been called a "dismal
inspiration" which "has begotten difficulty ever since." Hazard, supra note 8, at 262.
21 See the Court's discussion at 95 U.S. 734-36 dealing primarily with jurisdiction in
domestic relations cases and jurisdiction over nonresident business entities.
22 The inadequacy of the Pennoyer principles of exclusive sovereignty as the basis for a
system of jurisdiction in a mobile society has perhaps been most succinctly described in
Hazard, supra note 8, at 265.
There are doubtless other ways in which the Story principles can be understood
that are equally true and enlightening. But the one context in which the principles
are either not true or not enlightening is precisely that in which they have been
typically invoked, that is, in the adjudication of civil controversies having multistate
elements. If no multistate elements are involved, because either all elements are in a
particular state or none of them is, the formulation of a jurisdictional principle is
purely a scholastic exercise. Since in such a case there is no problem in reality, no
boundaries of reality exist to confine conceptual imagination within contours of fact,
policy, and definition that real legal problems entail.
On the other hand, when adjudication of civil controversies does involve multi-
state elements, it is fatuous to think of any court having exclusive jurisdiction of any-
thing. The jurisdictional problem exists precisely because there is no single tribunal
that has exclusive jurisdiction in the territorial sense.
23 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
24 In Harris v. Balk, Harris apparently had owed Balk a relatively small amount of money.
Both men were from North Carolina. Balk, in turn, was allegedly indebted to Epstein, a
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A greater need for change existed in the "power over people" sphere because of
the increasing importance of the corporation in commercial affairs and the in-
creasing popularity of the automobile as a means of transportation. As a result,
courts wrestled with the concepts of "corporate presence"2 and the "implied
consent" of non-resident motorists.2 6 These concepts enabled legal reality to keep
pace with a changing society. Direct questions about the continued wisdom of
the doctrine of Pennoyer were seldom asked, however, and legal theory lagged
behind.
B. International Shoe v. Washington: The Modern Era
The first overt change in jurisdictional theory came almost seventy years
after Pennoyer when the Supreme Court decided International Shoe Co. v. State
of Washington.2 7 That decision signaled the birth of the "minimum contacts"
theory of state court jurisdiction. It is a theory which places greater emphasis on
fairness to the defendant in the selection of a forum than it does on problems of
sovereignty. The "minimum contacts" test was articulated by the Court as
follows:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam
is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence
his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him .... But now that the capias
ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other
form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."28
The Court then went one step further by explaining the relationship between
''minimum contacts" and "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of
resident of Maryland. Epstein, who wished to collect upon this debt, saw his golden opportunity
when Harris traveled to Maryland, and he seized it. Knowing that he could not acquire in
personam jurisdiction over Balk unless he brought suit in North Carolina, Epstein attempted
to create a form of quasi in rem jurisdiction in Maryland by garnishing Harris, Balk's debtor,
while he was present in the state. The Supreme Court thought the effort successful, stating that
"[t]he obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies him wherever he
goes." 198 U.S. at 222.
25 See, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. McKibben, 243 U.S. 264 (1917) and Tauza
v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259 (1917).
26 See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) and Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S.
160 (1916).
27 326 U.S. 310 (1945). It should be noted that even prior to International Shoe there
were two traditional alternatives to jurisdiction grounded in physical presence per Pennoyer.
First, "[a]ctual consent . . .has always been regarded as a basis of jurisdiction in the common
law, for the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person has always been waivable by the
defendant." Developments, supra note 20, at 916. Second, there was strong authority that
"domicile" was an acceptable basis. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) and Blackmer
v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
28 326 U.S. at 316.
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that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so
far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within
the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit
brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.
9
A shift in the focus of the Supreme Court in evaluating the exercise of
judicial power by a state court is apparent. A constitutional standard of fairness,
rather than physical control, is the standard against which the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction was measured." This shift also permitted the Court to treat
the problem of notice separately, and the Court in International Shoe recognized
the validity of notice sent across state lines. 1 The importance of the decision and
the jurisdictional theory which it made law cannot be overstated. At the same
time, International Shoe, too, has its limitations, and these must be noted.
The key improvement of the new test is that "at least it puts the real ques-
tion, and that is something.13 2 Putting the real question is a virtue,3 and the
29 Id. at 319.
30 In applying that standard to the facts of the case before it, the International Shoe Court
held that the state courts of Washington could validly exercise jurisdiction over the corporate
defendant. Even though the defendant was incorporated under the laws of Delaware and had
its principal place of business in Missouri, it did engage in certain sales activities in Washington,
and the claims asserted in the lawsuit were for unemployment compensation tax obligations that
were created by the activities of the salesmen within Washington.
The activities of the defendant corporation in the state of Washington were thought by
the Court to be "continuous and systematic" and would presumably have been sufficient to
uphold the exercise of jurisdiction under the theories being applied by courts before the birth
of the "minimum contacts" test. The defendant's contacts were described by the Court in 326
U.S. at 313-14:
During the years from 1937 to 1940, now in question, appellant employed eleven to
thirteen salesmen under direct supervision and control of sales managers located in
St. Louis. These salesmen resided in Washington; their principal activities were con-
fined to that state; and they were compensated by commissions based upon the
amount of their sales. The commissions for each year totaled more than $31,000.
Appellant supplies its salesmen with a line of samples, each consisting of one shoe of
a pair, which they display to prospective purchasers. On occasion they rent permanent
sample rooms, for exhibiting samples, in business buildings, or rent rooms in hotels or
business buildings temporarily for that purpose.
The ties of the defendant to Washington are clearly not insignificant. The decision to subject
the defendant to jurisdiction in that state was not, therefore, a break from the past, in and of
itself.
31 An agent of the defendant corporation had been served with process while within the
state of Washington. In addition, the corporation had been served by registered mail in Missouri,
and the Court seemed to place its stamp of approval on this alternate procedure. "Nor can
we say that the mailing of the notice of suit to appellant by registered mail at its home office
was not reasonably calculated to apprise appellant of the suit." 326 U.S. at 320.
The Pennoyer disapproval of notice sent across state lines had been repeated in later
cases. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927), where the Court stated: "The
process of a court of one State cannot run into another and summon a party there domiciled to
respond to proceedings against him. Notice sent outside the State to a non-resident is un-
availing to give jurisdiction in an action against him personally for money recovery." By recog-
nizing the validity of notice sent across state lines, the Court added a dimension of flexibility to
state court proceedings. The Court also probably increased the likelihood that defendants will
actually receive notice. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
where the Court found notice mailed across state lines to defendants to be preferable to notice
by publication. Even in Hess the Court had upheld service on the defendant's "agent" in the
state only when accompanied by mailed notice to the defendant himself. See also, Wuchter
v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
32 The desirability of "putting the real question" in this area of the law may have first
been articulated by Judge Learned Hand in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d
Cir. 1930). In his opinion, which was referred to by the Supreme Court in International Shoe.
Judge Hand described the appropriate jurisdictional inquiry as follows:
When we say, therefore, that a corporation may be sued only where it ii
"present," we understand that the word is used, not literally, but as shorthand foi
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International Shoe test at least attempts to do that. Simplicity, predictability and
ease of application are also virtues, however, but they were sacrificed, perhaps as
a matter of necessity, in this opinion. Whatever may be their merits as constitu-
tional standards,34 tests such as "fairness, .... justice" and "reasonableness" un-
deniably create a measure of uncertainty in terms of their future application.
An equally significant problem in terms of the growth of jurisdictional theory
is the relatively limited scope of the International Shoe opinion. 5 The minimum
contacts test was not offered as part of a complete restructuring of even the
"power over people" half of the Pennoyer formula for jurisdiction. Rather than
superseding what had gone before, the minimum contacts test was created as a
tool for further expansion of state court jurisdiction and was offered as a supple-
something else ... There must be some continuous dealings in the state of the forum;
enough to demand a trial away from its home.
This last appears to us to be really the controlling consideration, expressed shortly
by the word "presence," but involving an estimate of the inconveniences which would
result from requiring it to defend where it has been sued. We are to inquire whether
the extent and continuity of what it has done in the state in question makes it
reasonable to bring it before one of its courts. Nor is it anomalous to make the
question of jurisdiction depend upon a practical test . . . This does not indeed avoid
the uncertainties, for it is as hard to judge what dealings make it just to subject a
foreign corporation to local suit, as to say when it is "present," but at least it puts
the real question, and that is something. In its solution we can do no more than
follow the decided cases.
45 F.2d at 141.
33 Perhaps the classic criticism of the tests applied prior to International Shoe, including
the test of "corporate presence," is contained in F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 35 (1960).
Clearly the question of where a corporation is, when it incorporates in one state
and has agents transacting corporate business in another state, is not a question that
can be answered by empirical observation. Nor is it a question that demands for its
solution any analysis of political considerations or social ideals. It is, in fact, a
question identical in metaphysical status with the question which scholastic the-
ologians are supposed to have argued at great length, "How many angels can stand
on the point of a needle?" Now it is extremely doubtful whether any of the
scholastics ever actually discussed this question. Yet the question has become, for
us, a symbol of an age in which thought without roots in reality was an object of
high esteem.
Will future historians deal more charitably with such legal questions as "Where
is a corporation?" Nobody has ever seen a corporation. What right have we to
believe in corporations if we don't believe in angels? To be sure, some of us have
seen corporate funds, corporate transactions, etc. (just as s6me of us have seen
angelic deeds, angelic countenances, etc.). But this does not give us the right to
hypostatize, to "thingify," the corporation, and to assume that it travels about from
State to State as mortal men travel (footnote omitted) (emphasis deleted).
34 Justice Black, in a separate opinion, criticized the standards adopted by the Court on
constitutional grounds:
I believe that the Federal Constitution leaves to each State, without any "ifs"
or "buts," a power to tax and to open the doors of its Courts for its citizens to sue
corporations whose agents do business in those States. Believing that the Constitution
gave the States that power, I think it a judicial deprivation to condition its ex-
ercise upon this Court's notion of "fair play," however appealing that term may be.
Nor can I stretch the meaning of due process so far as to authorize this Court to
deprive a State of the right to afford judicial protection to its citizens on the
ground that it would be more "convenient" for the corporation to be sued somewhere
else. There is a strong emotional appeal in the words "fair play," "justice," and
"reasonableness." But they were not chosen by those who wrote the original Constitu-
tion or the Fourteenth Amendment as a measuring rod for this Court to use in in-
validating State or Federal laws passed by elected legislative respresentatives.
326 U.S. at 324-25.
35 Since the bulk of civil litigation presumably consists of in personam actions, the lack
of certainty accompanying the minimum contacts standard is probably the bigger problem for
one dealing with jurisdictional problems on a day-to-day basis. In terms of jurisdictional theory,
however, the bigger problem is probably the limited scope of International Shoe.
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ment and not a replacement.' 6 As a result, certain undesirable aspects of the
Pennoyer tests for in personam jurisdiction remained. 7 In addition, the Inter-
national Shoe opinion did not speak directly to the problems of jurisdiction based
upon "power over property," and the distinctions between in personam, in rem,
and quasi in rem retained their vitality.
The thirty years since International Shoe have been boom years for the law
of state court jurisdiction. The period has seen the widespread adoption of state
long arm statutes38 and the implementation of the minimum contacts theory.
Litigants have advanced creative arguments for the expansion of state court
power, and the courts have been largely receptive to those suggestions. 9 This
period of growth and expansion has not been subject to universal acclaim, how-
ever. Numerous commentators" and a handful of courts41 have expressed dissatis-
faction with existing jurisdictional theory. Common sources of discontent have
been the difficulty of applying the minimum contacts test and the artificiality of
the line drawn between actions grounded, since International Shoe, in "fairness
to people" and those grounded, per Pennoyer, in "power over property." This
period of growth has also been a period of relative silence on the part of the
Supreme Court.
36 In the words of the Court, minimum contacts could now be applied as the standard,
"if he [the defendant] be not present within the territory of the forum .. " 326 U.S. at 316.
Presumably, therefore, if the defendant is found within the territory of the forum and served
with process there, jurisdiction will be permissible under the older standards of presence and
power and reference to minimum contacts and fairness is unnecessary.
37 The most undesirable aspect of the Pennoyer rule is probably that which holds that ser-
vice of process upon the defendant while he is present in the forum state is not only a necessary
condition, but is also an always sufficient condition, for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
there. See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 "(E.D. Ark. 1959) and Ehrenzweig,
The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Non Conveniens,
65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
38 Unless a state's legislature has enacted statutory authorization, the courts of the state
are generally powerless to exercise judisdiction where the basis upon which jurisdiction is
asserted did not exist at common law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 29, Comment C. "Long arm" statutes authorize courts to exercise jurisdiction in a
manner consistent with the minimum contacts test. They also generally specify the means by
which process may be served upon a nonresident defendant.
Long arm statutes may take a variety of forms. A few states have, for example, enacted
the broadest provisions possible by permitting their courts to exercise jurisdiction on any
constitutionally permissible basis. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West); N.J. REv.
STAT. 4:4-4 (i); and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33. Other states have enacted "single act"
statutes which permit the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who has com-
mitted a specified act, provided that the claim being litigated arises from the act. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193 (Supp. 1978) (West); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 '(Supp. 1978);
MD. CODE ANN. § 96; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1975); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.38.2 (Supp. 1977) (Page); and VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1 (Supp. 1978).
The literature dealing with long arm statutes includes: Currie, The Growth of the Long
Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L. F. 533; Sutton, Today's
Long-Arm and Products Liability: A Plea for a Contemporary Notion of Fair Play and Sub-
stantial Justice, 41 INS. C. J. 85 (1974) ; Developments, supra note 20.
39 See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal. 2d 893,
458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 11.
2d 432, 176 N.E.2d. 761 (1961); and Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d
99, 216 (1966).
40 Ehrenzweig, supra note 37; Hazard, supra note 8; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really
Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REv. 657 (1959) ; von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. Rav. 1121 (1966); Developments supra note 20.
41 Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130-43 (3rd Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., con-
curring); United States Indus. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3rd Cir. 1976) ; Bekins v. Huish, 1 Ariz.
App. 258, 401 P.2d 743 (1965); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960
(1957); Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976).
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III. The Framework of State Court Jurisdiction
A. The Nature of the Problem: "Power Over Property" v. "Fairness to People"
It was inevitable, however, that the continued exercise of jurisdiction based
upon "power over property" would be challenged in the courts and that those
challenges would eventually reach the Supreme Court's docket. It was also
probably predictable, at least in the recent past, that the challenges might take
one of two forms. As has already been noted, the Pennoyer Court envisioned
that in an action based upon "power over property" the property would be "in
the first instance brought under the control of the court by attachment or some
other equivalent act."42 While the notice-giving function of this seizure dimin-
ished in importance as the fiction that an owner is in constant possession of his
property was given less credence and as other means of providing notice were
recognized,4" the theoretical importance of an early seizure to protect the basis
of the court's jurisdiction remained." At the same time, however, the validity of
such pre-hearing seizures could be challenged under emerging standards of pro-
cedural due process.
In a series of four cases" decided between 1969 and 1975 the Supreme
Court dealt with the constitutional problems posed by the use of provisional
remedies. In those cases the plaintiffs had, prior to trial and without a hearing,
seized property, at least arguably owned by the defendant, through the use of
devices such as garnishment, replevin and sequestration. The purpose of the
seizures was to secure the judgments that were sought by the plaintiffs. While
it is difficult to reconcile the four opinions in a totally satisfactory manner,"6 it is
fair to say that one general message delivered by the Court was that such seizures
of property prior to a hearing are constitutional only if the defendant is provided
with certain significant protections.47 Those protections are not generally afforded
defendants whose property is seized for the creation of in rem jurisdiction. A key
unanswered question, then, was whether less demanding standards should apply
merely because the property is seized to create jurisdiction rather than to secure a
judgment."
42 95 U.S. at 727.
43 As has already been indicated at note 19 supra the traditional dogma that notice
requirements are significantly less strict in "power over property" actions than they are in
"power over people" actions was rejected in Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950). See also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) and Walker v.
City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956). Flexibility was added when the validity of notice sent
across state lines was recognized. See note 31 supra.
44 See note 9 supra.
45 North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969),
and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
46 One attempt at reconciliation is made in Kay & Lubin, Making Sense of the Prejudg-
ment Seizure Cases, 64 Kent. L.J. 705 (1976).
47 The Court in North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., the final case in the quartet,
struck down a Georgia garnishment statute because it lacked the "saving characteristics" of the
Louisiana sequestration statute which had been upheld in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600 (1974). Those "saving characteristics" included the participation of a judicial officer
in the proceedings resulting in the seizure, the posting of a bond by the plaintiff, factual
affidavits supporting the seizure, and the opportunity for both prompt review of the seizure
and rebonding.
48 The typical argument that seizures to create in rem jurisdiction should be subject to a
less stringent procedural due process test relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Ownbey
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In addition, it could be argued that the entire "power over property" branch
of the framework for state court jurisdiction should be measured against the tests
of International Shoe and that when so measured it would be found wanting.
Despite the difficulties inherent in applying the minimum contacts test of Inter-
national Shoe, its foundation, grounded in notions of fundamental fairness, was
almost universally recognized as an improvement over the Pennoyer tests, which
were grounded in notions of physical power. Pennoyer continued, however, to
provide the underpinnings for in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, which
depended solely on the seizure of property. Quasi in rem jurisdiction presented
the greatest affront to the emerging standards of fairness. To continue to permit
the seizure of property, unrelated to the claims asserted in the litigation, to be an
always sufficient condition for the exercise of jurisdiction was glaringly incon-
sistent with the philosophy of International Shoe.
Special problems exist with respect to the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction
based upon the seizure of intangible property because such exercises of jurisdiction
are, in a very real sense, inconsistent not only with the doctrine of International
Shoe but with the doctrine of Pennoyer as well. Pennoyer, again, stood essentially
for the proposition that the jurisdiction of a state court depended upon physical
control of either people or property. Physical control does have a "real world"
meaning in an in personam action when used in reference to a defendant who is
a natural person, as was the defendant in Mitchell v. Neff. As has already been
noted, however, that "real world" meaning evaporates when the concept is ap-
plied to a corporate defendant. 9 Similar problems exist in the realm of in rem
and quasi in rem jurisdiction. As long as the property providing the court with its
jurisdictional base is tangible property, such as the real estate involved in
Pennoyer, the concept of physically controlling that property has meaning within
the common understanding of those terms. The property does have a verifiable
location, and it can be physically seized. The same cannot be said for intangible
property. Such property is "located" where the law says it is located and can be
"seized" only in a legal sense.
Courts and legislatures have, of course, made the situs and seizure deter-
minations referred to above, at least with respect to certain types of intangible
property. The Supreme Court itself made such a determination in Harris v. Balk
when it gave its blessing to the "seizure" in Maryland of an obligation owed by
one North Carolina resident to another North Carolina resident." The New
York courts have made similar, but more recent and widely criticized, determina-
tions by holding that a New York insurer's obligation to a non-resident insured
can be seized in New York to create quasi in rem jurisdiction there." In making
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) which, it is argued, places jurisdictional seizures within the
"extraordinary situations" exception to the requirements of Sniadach and its progeny. See the
Court's references to this possibility in Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339 and in Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91
n.23.
49 See notes 32 and 33 supra.
50 Harris is discussed at note 24 supra.
51 The creation of quasi in rem jurisdiction by the attachment of an insurance obligation
was first upheld in Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
There the plaintiffs, residents of New York, sued the defendant, a resident of Quebec, in New
York. Jurisdiction was upheld since defendant's insurer did business in New York and the
policy was, therefore, attachable there, even though the auto accident giving rise to the lawsuit
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these determinations, however, the courts have been forced to stretch Pennoyer
through the use of fictions in an undesirable way very similar to the stretching
that occurred with respect to in'personam actions prior to International Shoe.
One somewhat unique possibility for the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction
over intangible property was created by the law of the State of Delaware.52 The
Delaware Court of Chancery is directed by state law53 to seize property owned by
a non-resident defendant which is present within the state, when requested to do
so by the plaintiff. No relationship of any kind between the property seized and
the pending action is required. 4 The avowed purpose of the statute is to procure
a general appearance by the non-resident defendant. No limited appearance"5 is,
therefore, permitted, and the court is authorized to sell the property in case of a
default."
The utility of this procedure is greatly enhanced by a state statute 7 which
declares that the situs of all stock issued by Delaware corporations is Delaware,
irrespective of the location of the stock certificates themselves. This provision is
in direct conflict with § 8-317(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code,"' which
has been adopted in the other forty-nine states, and is of particular importance
because of the large number of corporations chartered in Delaware. It was a
challenge to this procedure which led to the Supreme Court's review of the
American law of jurisdiction in Shaffer v. Heitner.
Shaffer was not, however, the first case in which a legal attack had been
levelled against the Delaware procedure. The procedure had, in fact, been upheld
against constitutional attack in a number of earlier Delaware state court cases.59
occurred in Vermont.
Seider was reaffirmed in Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287
N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967). In an opinion denying reargument in Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d
990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968), the New York Court of Appeals limited
Seider, however, by holding that the judgment in such a case could not exceed the face value
of the policy even if the defendant appeared and defended. Subsequently, the Seider doctrine
was upheld against constitutional attack in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.
1969). The Seider doctrine has, however, generally been rejected in other states. See, e.g.,
Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976).
52 The following description of that procedure is intentionally brief. For a complete dis-
cussion, see Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 COLIum. L.
REV. 749 (1973).
53 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 provides in part:
(a) The Court may compel the appearance of the defendant by the seizure of
all or any part of his property, which property may be sold under the order of the
Court to pay the demand of the plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear, or other-
wise defaults....
54 Breech v. Hughes Tool Co., 41 Del. Ch. 128, 189 A.2d 428 (1963).
55 A limited appearance is one in which the defendant in an in rem or quasi in rem
action goes beyond simply raising jurisdictional objections and defends the action on the
merits. The maximum exposure of the defendant is, however, limited to the value of the
property seized. The defendant will not be subject to a personal judgment in excess of that
amount.
56 Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 340, 117 A.2d 365 (1955).
57 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 provides: "For all purposes of title, action, attachment,
garnishment and jurisdiction of all courts held in this State, but not for the purpose of taxa-
tion, the situs of the ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws
of this State, whether organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded as in this
State."
58 U.C.C. § 8-317(1) provides: "No attachment or levy upon a security or any share or
other interest evidenced thereby which is outstanding shall be valid until the security is actually
seized by the officer making the attachment or levy but a security which has been surrendered
to the issuer may be attached or levied upon at the source."
59 In addition to the Delaware Supreme Court cases dealing with such challenges, which
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The Delaware Supreme Court first considered an International Shoe challenge
to the Delaware stock sequestration procedure in Breech v. Hughes Tool CO."
There the non-resident defendant whose stock was sequestered asserted that con-
stitutionally mandated standards of fair play dictated that the selection of a situs
for intangible property be a reasonable one and argued that where there was no
link between the property seized and the claims asserted the selection of Delaware
as the situs was unreasonable. The Delaware Court was quick to reject these
contentions, relying upon opinions of the United States Supreme Court6 which
it felt established the power of Delaware to fix the situs of stock issued by Dela-
ware corporations and largely ignoring any implications that International Shoe
might have for the case.2
The problem was raised again in United States Industries v. Gregg"' and was
dealt with in a somewhat more direct manner by the federal district court there.64
In Gregg the non-resident defendant's International Shoe attack was paired with
the procedural due process attack, based upon lack of notice and an opportunity
to be heard, which is referred to above. While the bulk of the district court's
efforts were directed toward the issues raised by this second challenge, it proved
ultimately to be unproductive for the defendant.2 The district court also rejected
the defendant's International Shoe contentions. According to the court, the
"'minimal contacts" doctrine is not applicable where the plaintiff invokes the
are discussed infra, a number of Delaware lower court opinions also deal with the validity of
the statutory procedure, including Hibou, Inc. v. Ramsing, 324 A.2d 777 (Del. Super. 1974).
60 41 Del. Ch. 128, 189 A.2d 428 (1963).
61 Principal reliance was placed upon Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U.S. 1
(1900) and Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933).
62 The strength of the challenges raised in Breech may have been distorted somewhat by
the posture of the party raising them. The action, claiming mismanagement of Trans World
Airlines, Inc., was brought by T.W.A. against its majority shareholders, Howard Hughes and
the Hughes Tool Company. "Quasi in rem" jurisdiction was acquired through sequestration
of Hughes Tool Company stock. The defendant asserted a number of counterclaims, including
one against Breech, who was brought in as an additional defendant. Jurisdiction was obtained
by sequestering his Ford Motor Company stock. Breech argued that the seizure of his stock did
not create a constitutionally permissible basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, but at the same
time argued that the plaintiff's seizure of stock to create jurisdiction with respect to the
original defendants was permissible because that stock bore a closer relationship to the under-
lying claims.
63 348 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Del. 1972).
64 In Gregg the jurisdictional challenges were asserted not in a state court but in a federal
court. The action had, however, been removed from state court and did not involve any
"nationwide service of process" provisions. It was assumed, therefore, that the jurisdictional
restraints on the state and federal courts were identical.
A problem not raised by the Gregg facts is the extent to which Congress may provide for
"nationwide service of process." It may be that the fifth amendment restricts federal court
activity much as the fourteenth amendment restricts state court activity, at least in some cases.
On April 28, 1978, a petition for certiorari was filed in Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.
1977), a case in which a challenge to the power of Congress to provide for "nationwide service
of process" was rejected. For a discussion of some aspects of the problems of personal jurisdic-
tion in federal court litigation, see Seeburger, The Federal Long Arm: The Uses of Diversity,
or 'Taint So, McGee,' 10 IND. L. REv. 480 (1977).
65 In the eyes of the Court, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) and Ownbey v. Morgan,
256 U.S. 94 (1921), when read together, stand for the proposition that seizures of the type
employed in Gregg are permissible when a "tripartite test" is met. Under that test, the seizure
must have been "directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public
interest," there must have been a "special need for very prompt action," and the State must
have kept "strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force." The Court found that this
test was met. See its discussion in 348 F. Supp. at 1020-23.
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quasi in rem jurisdiction of the court and the state of incorporation may constitu-
tionally provide that the situs of the corporation's capital stock is in its home
state. The court went on to hold that even though the statute in question is
designed to produce a basis for in personam jurisdiction, it does not follow that
the action was not one governed by the rules applicable to quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion. In a later opinion,"6 the court decided that the defendant had no right to
make a limited appearance in the case.
The findings of the federal district court in Gregg-which were based in
part upon the determinations of the Delaware Supreme Court in Breech-were
embraced and reapplied by the Delaware Supreme Court in Greyhound Corp.
v. Heitner,"7 the decision reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shaffer. Again,
the defendant's constitutional attack upon the Delaware procedure was two-
pronged, and again the defendant met with a double-barreled rebuff. While the
court dealt rather deliberately with the "prenotice seizure problem," it dismissed
the International Shoe claim as insignificant and adopted "the analysis made and
the conclusion reached" by the district court in Gregg."
Shortly after the Delaware Supreme Court spoke in Greyhound Corp. v.
Heitner, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the federal district
court's decision in Gregg. 9 The Court of Appeals dismissed the "cryptic con-
clusions" of the Delaware Supreme Court in Greyhound and the federal district
court in Gregg, specifically holding that the standards of International Shoe were
determinative in assessing the validity of the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction."°
The stage was thus set. The Supreme Court of Delaware and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit were in sharp disagreement with respect to an im-
portant matter of federal constitutional law. The dispute was not likely to go
away,"' and its resolution by the Supreme Court was in order."
66 United States Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 58 F.R.D. 469 (D. Del. 1973).
67 361 A.2d 225 (Del. Super. 1976).
68 The court's view of the minimum contacts claim is made clear by one sentence from
the opinion: "There are significant constitutional questions at issue here but we say at once that
we do not deem the rule of International Shoe to be one of them." 361 A.2d at 229.
69 United States Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 "(3rd Cir. 1976).
70 The Third Circuit, in rejecting the holdings of the federal district court and of the
Delaware Supreme Court stated, "We cannot accept the notion that the mere proliferation of
unwarranted reliances on old cases suffices to settle a contemporary issue in a dynamic field of
law." 540 F.2d at 151. The court's conclusion with respect to the continued validity of juris-
diction based upon "power over property" was as follows:
We can only understand Mullane and Hanson as establishing a constitutional limit
to state court jurisdiction wholly independent of the label-in rem, quasi in rem, or in
personam-that may be affixed to that jurisdiction. And whether it be called
affiliating circumstances or minimum contacts, we must assume that ultimately the
test of International Shoe is determinative: that there be sufficient connection with
the forum "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice' " (cite and footnotes omitted).
540 F.2d at 154.
The Circuit Court's view of jurisdiction was also applied in Barber-Greene Co. v. Walco
Nat'l Corp., 428 F. Supp. 567 (D. Del. 1977) a short time before the Supreme Court's
decision in Shaffer.
71 It is clear that decisions of the United States Supreme Court involving questions of fed-
eral law are binding on state courts. Where a federal question has not been passed upon by the
Supreme Court but only by a lower federal court, however, state courts may not be bound by
the decision. See United States ex. rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970).
72 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in United States Indus., Inc. v.
Gregg, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
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B. Shaffer v. Heitner: "Power Over Property" Rejected
The improbable plaintiff in Shaffer v. Heitner73 was a minor owning one
share of stock in the Greyhound Corporation. He brought a shareholder's deriva-
tive action, naming as defendants that corporation and Greyhound Lines, Inc., its
wholly owned subsidiary, as well as twenty-eight individuals who had served as
officers or directors of the corporations. The plaintiff's claims were instigated as a
reaction to two earlier lawsuits in which the corporations were fined a total of
$600,000 for contempt of court and were subjected to an adverse judgment in the
amount of $13,146,090 plus $1,250,000 in attorneys' fees for anti-trust violations.7 4
The plaintiff contended that these liabilities resulted from breaches by the in-
dividual defendants of the fiduciary duties which they owed the corporate de-
fendants.
Even though neither the plaintiff nor any of the individual defendants was
a resident of Delaware,7 5 and even though the activities giving rise to the underly-
ing corporate liabilities were centered in Oregon,7" the action was commenced in
a Delaware Court of Chancery. In order to effectuate his jurisdictional choice,
the plaintiff made use of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169"7 and DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 366.78 Pursuant to those provisions, the defendants were notified of the
pending action both by registered mail and by publication, and, most important,
82,000 shares of Greyhound common stock belonging to nineteen of the in-
dividual defendants and having a value of approximately $1.2 million were
"seized."79  Options belonging to two other individual defendants were also
"seized."
73 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
74 Between 1947 and 1956 Greyhound Corporation and Greyhound Lines, Inc., acquired
eight bus companies in the western United States. All of these acquisitions were subject to
Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.) approval. Mt. Hood Lines, a competitor, opposed
the acquisitions before the I.C.C. Greyhound officials then made certain representations to
overcome the opposition. Specifically, they promised not to disturb existing traffic patterns, not
to route passengers circuitously, to display Mt. Hood schedules, to advise passengers of the most
direct routes (even if on competing lines) and to continue a through bus with Mt. Hood from
Washington to California. The acquisitions were approved.
In 1964 Mt. Hood petitioned the I.C.C. to reconsider the acquisitions. It was found by
the I.C.C. that Greyhound had violated some of the representations made in the earlier proceed-
ings, and an order directing Greyhound to conform to its representations was issued. Grey-
hound then brought suit in federal district court to set aside the I.C.C. order. Not only were
the corporations unsuccessful, but in an opinion at 363 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1973) they
were found to be in contempt, and in an opinion at 370 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Ill. 1974) sanctions
were imposed. The finding and the sanctions were affirmed at 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974).
Mt. Hood also brought a private action seeking a recovery under the federal antitrust
laws in federal district court in Oregon. The district court's award of $13,146,090 was
affirmed by the court of appeals in Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687
(9th Cir. 1977). In an opinion delivered almost exactly one year after its opinion in Shaffer
v. Heitner, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for
further proceedings. The basis for remand was that the lower court had erred in holding that
the Clayton Act's statute of limitations had been tolled by the government's intervention in the
I.C.C. proceedings and that the action might, therefore, have been barred by the statute of
limitations. 98 S.Ct. 2370 (1978).
75 The Greyhound Corporation is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in Arizona. Greyhound Lines, Inc., is a California corporation with its principal place of
business in Arizona.
76 See note 74 supra.
77 See note 57 supra.
78 See note 53 supra.
79 "These seizures were accomplished by placing 'stop transfer' orders or their equivalents
on the books of the Greyhound Corp." 433 U.S. at 192.
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These twenty-one defendants entered a special appearance'0 to challenge
the court's jurisdiction. Their attack on the Delaware court's jurisdiction raised
problems which have already been alluded to:
[T]hat the sequestration statute as applied in this case violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment both because it permits the
state courts to exercise jurisdiction despite the absence of sufficient contacts
among the defendants, the litigation and the State of Delaware and because
it authorizes the deprivation of defendants' property without providing
adequate procedural safeguards.
81
It might have been predicted that, when confronted squarely with the issue, the
United States Supreme Court would express disapproval of the Delaware seques-
tration statute. What could not have been so easily foreseen was the form that
the expression of disapproval would take and the impact that it would have upon
the law of jurisdiction generally.
Supreme Court dissatisfaction with the line traditionally drawn between
actions in personam and actions in rem had first been expressed on a much earlier
occasion. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 2 the Court stated:
Distinctions between actions in rem and those in personam are ancient
and originally expressed in procedural terms what really seems to have been
a distinction in the substantive law of property under a system quite unlike
our own ... American courts have sometimes classed certain actions as in
rem because personal service of process was not required, and at other times
have held personal service of process not required because the action was in
rem ....
But in any event we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification
for which the standards are so elusive and confused generally and which,
being primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary from state to
state. Without disparaging the usefulness of distinctions between actions
in rem and those in personam in many branches of law, or on other issues, or
the reasoning which underlies them, we do'not rest the power of the State
to resort to constructive service in this proceeding upon how its courts or
this Court may regard this historic antithesis.
8 3
The seeds for change were, therefore, present. The line separating "fairness to
people" from "power over property" was, however, called into question in a some-
what tangential way in Mullane,"4 and a complete reevaluation of the permissible
80 A "special appearance" is one in which the defendant raises jurisdictional objections
and does nothing more. Special appearances have been abolished in most jurisdictions in the
sense that jurisdictional objections can ordinarily be joined with other defenses. See, e.g., FED. R.
Crv. P. 12. In arn in rem or quasi in rem action in a jurisdiction which does not permit a
limited appearance, however, the assertion of other defenses would ordinarily expose the
defendant to the possibility of a judgment exceeding the value of the property seized.
81 433 U.S. at 189.
82 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
83 Id. at 312-13.
84 In Mulane the trustee of a common trust created under the laws of New York brought
an action in state court there to settle its accounts. The purpose of such an action is to cut off
any claims which the trust beneficiaries might have against the trustee. The court appointed
guardian for the income beneficiaries opposed the settlement of accounts and challenged the
jurisdiction of the court.
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bases for the exercise of judicial power by state courts was not forthcoming then.
Such a reevaluation was undertaken in Shaffer, and the traditional line of
demarcation was erased. Even though the parties and the Delaware courts had
both apparently viewed the procedural due process problems as presenting the
more substantial challenge to the statutory procedure,85 the Supreme Court chose
to rest its decision squarely on jurisdictional grounds. The Court spoke boldly and
broadly, directing its attention to the minimum contacts issue, speaking to the
basic structure of state court jurisdiction, and ignoring possibilities for less sweep-
ing rulings that could have been used to achieve the same result in the case before
it.
It must be borne in mind that the Delaware procedure applied in the Shaffer
case gave rise to some rather specific and serious problems. First, the defendants
were not entitled to make a limited appearance. By appearing and defending
upon the merits of the quasi in rem action, they would be subjecting themselves
to the personal jurisdiction of the Delaware court and exposing themselves to
potential personal liabilities in excess of the value of the property seized. What
this meant under the facts of the case is that the defendants were forced to choose
between defaulting on the merits, thereby forfeiting well over $1 million in
property "held" by the Delaware courts, or appearing and defending on the
merits, thereby protecting that property to the greatest extent possible but risking
potential personal judgments of close to $15 million.8"
The purpose of the Delaware procedure is to coerce a general personal ap-
pearance from the defendant, and in this kind of situation the statute works well.
In making his jurisdictional challenge the guardian argued that the action should be
characterized as a proceeding "in personam." One apparent advantage which he sought by
advancing that argument was an increased likelihood that the New York courts would be held
to lack the power to settle the accounts, at least to the extent that settlement would involve
the cutting off of potential claims belonging to non-resident beneficiaries. If the action were
thought to be a proceeding in -rem, the power of the court to act would, under traditional
rules of jurisdiction, flow from the presence of the trust assets in New York. If the action
were thought to be a proceeding in personam, on the other hand, potential claims could
presumably be cut off only with respect to those beneficiaries possessing the requisite minimum
contacts.
The Court scarcely broke stride in dealing with this portion of the argument, holding that
whatever the classification of the action, the interest of New York in regulating these trusts
was a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by its Courts. The bulk of the Court's
attention was instead directed to the second portion of the trustee's argument: that if the
action were thought to be in personam, service by publication would not suffice, though it
might if the action were thought to be in rem. The Court rejected service by publication under
the circumstances without attaching a jurisdictional label to the case.
85 That the Delaware courts viewed the "procedural due process" problems as being
more substantial is apparent from a reading of their opinions. Little effort is expended in
disposing of the "minimum contacts" challenge. See, e.g., note 68 supra. The parties' briefs
suggested that they, too, viewed the "procedural due process" challenge as being relatively
more significant. Such a judgment might have been prompted, at least in part, by the decision
in Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3rd Cir. 1976).
In Jonnet the court struck down a Pennsylvania "foreign attachment" procedure because
the seizure of the defendant's property was neither preceded by notice and a hearing nor accom-
panied by adequate safeguards. The court rejected the argument that such protections need
not be provided when the property is seized to create jurisdiction. Judge Gibbons, in a con-
curring opinion, found the exercise of jurisdiction based upon the seizure of the property to be
improper when measured against the tests of International Shoe.
86 The Supreme Court's later decision on the statute of limitations issue in Mt. Hood
Stages, Inc., referred to in note 74 supra diminishes the likelihood of a $15 million recovery.
That possibility remains, however, and was even more likely at the time Shaffer was commenced
and when the defendants had to decide whether or not to appear and defend.
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Because of the natural reluctance to give up the stock and other property with-
out a fight, the likelihood of coercing a general appearance from the defendants,
once their property has been "seized," is very great. It has been suggested, how-
ever, that to condition the defendant's right to defend on the merits and thereby
protect his property upon his submission to personal jurisdiction is violative of
due process."
Despite this suggestion, existing case law is at best ambivalent with respect
to even the desirability of a limited appearance and contains scant support for
the proposition that a failure to provide for a limited appearance amounts to a
breach of constitutional protections which must be afforded a defendant.8
Nonetheless, the court of appeals in Gregg had placed some reliance upon the
absence of a right to make a limited appearance in striking down the Delaware
procedure:
[T]he non-resident defendant is inexorably put to a Hobson's choice: either
surrender by default the entire value of the seized property or submit to in
personam jurisdiction. Keeping in mind the admonition of Mullane that
constitutional standards do not depend on "elusive and confused" state law
classifications, we wonder whether this jurisdiction realistically ought to be
considered as quasi in rem. The purpose of the Delaware procedure is to
coerce the non-resident to submit to in personam jurisdiction.8 9
The Supreme Court, however, attached importance to the lack of a provision for
a limited appearance only with respect to the question of appealability. 90
A second, and even more basic, problem with the Delaware procedure which
might have provided the basis for a narrower holding in Shaffer was the fact that
jurisdiction was based upon the seizure of an intangible, the obligation of a
87 Developments, supra note 20, at 953-55.
88 "A question that has been the subject of considerable debate but little judicial action
over the years is whether a defendant in an action commenced on a quasi-in-rem basis can ap-
pear for the limited purpose of defending his interest in the attached or seized property without
exposing himself to a full in personam judgment." 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 511 (1969). Federal cases approaching the problem generally have done so
from the perspective of what would be a desirable federal rule, not from the perspective of what
might be constitutionally mandated. See Dry Clime Corp. v. G. L. Edwards, 389 F.2d 590 (5th
Cir. 1968). See also Blume, Actions Quasi In Rem Under Section 1655, Title 28, U.S.C.,
50 Micn. L. REv. 1 (1951); Note, Effect of a General Appearance to the In Rem Cause in a
Quasi In Rem Action, 25 IowA L. REv. 329 (1940); and Note, The "Right" to Defend
Federal Quasi In Rem Actions Without Submitting to the Personal Jurisdiction of the
Court, 48 IowA L. REv. 441 (1963). /
89 540 F.2d at 156.
90 The Court, according to its own characterization, was consistent with the "pragmatic"
approach followed in the past in determining whether an order was "final" for purposes of
appealability. Here the order was deemed final because "appellants would have the choice of
suffering a default judgment or entering a general appearance and defending on the merits."
433 U.S. at 195 n.12.
Despite one commentator's observation that the Shaffer approach "would seem to indicate
that the evil in Harris v. Balk was the unavailability of a limited appearance and not the
assumption of jurisdiction," Williams, The Validity of Assuming jurisdiction by the Attach-
ment of Automobile Liability Insurance Obligations: The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner on
Seider v. Roth, 9 RUT.-CAM. L. J. 241, 260 (1977), there is little in the opinion to support
this position. In fact, as is noted in that article, there is language in the opinion directly to the
contrary: It is true that the potential liability of a defendant in an in rem action is limited by
the value of the property, but that limitation does not affect the argument. The
fairness of subjecting a defendant to state-court jurisdiction does not depend upon the
size of the claim being litigated.
433 U.S. at 207 n.23.
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corporation to its shareholders. Jurisdiction based upon "make believe" seizures
of this sort, as was discussed earlier,91 had been born in Harris v. Balk"5 and had
returned in what was described as "nightmarish form"93 in the series of New York
cases beginning with Seider v. Roth. 4 The Court, in describing the development
of the law of jurisdiction, discussed Harris and noted that particular problems
were created by jurisdictional exercises of its type. The seizure of the intangible
in Shaffer is rendered even more unpalatable by the fact that the Delaware
statute establishing a situs for the corporate stock is inconsistent with the rule
which had been adopted by every other American jurisdiction.9" Once again,
however, the Supreme Court looked beyond this more limited problem and chose
to frame a broader rule governing jurisdiction based upon seizures of tangible as
well as intangible property.
Finally, the Court might have limited itself to an assessment of the continued
validity of jurisdiction based upon the seizure of property bearing no relationship
to the controversy being litigated. While the property seized at the commence-
ment of this action did arguably bear some relationship to the underlying dis-
pute,9 7 the Court refused to recognize that relationship and chose instead to
classify Shaffer as a quasi in rem action of the Harris v. Balk type, a particularly
suspect class of cases. 8 The problems posed by that type of case did not, however,
mark the outer boundary of either the Court's concern or its proclamation.9
It is possible, of course, to argue that the holding of Shaffer is implicitly
limited by the factors referred to above. Such arguments undoubtedly will be
made. Such arguments fail to take account of the nature and sweep of the clear
language of this opinion, however. The Court, in painstaking fashion, analyzed
the development of the American law of jurisdiction and questioned "the con-
tinued soundness of the conceptual structure founded on the century old case of
Pennoyer v. Neff."' It concluded that the entire "power over property" branch
of the Pennoyer framework for jurisdiction should be scrapped and that "all
assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards
set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."1"1 The message delivered by the
Court in Shaffer is a message of very general application.
The impetus for this fundamental change in jurisdictional theory was dis-
closed in two observations by the Court. The Court recognized that the exercise
91 See note 24 supra.
92 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
93 Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JOHN'S
L. Rav. 668, 671 (1975).
94 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 NY.S.2d 99 (1966). See note 51 supra and the
accompanying text.
95 433 U.S. at 201 n.18.
96 See U.C.C. § 8-317(1), which is set forth in note 58 supra.
97 The stock seized was, after all, stock in the defendant corporations. And, while stock
ownership was apparently not a prerequisite to holding office or a directorship in the corpora-
tions, the two do often go hand in hand.
98 See the Court's opinion in 433 U.S. at 208-09.
99 The presence or absence of a relationship between the controversy being adjudicated
and property owned by the defendant in the state will, however, be important in assessing the
significance of property ownership as a "contact." See the text accompanying notes 106-18
infra.
100 433 U.S. at 196.
101 Id. at 212.
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of jurisdiction based upon "power over property" had always rested upon a
fiction. In the words of the Court,
The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the same test of "fair play
and substantial justice" as governs assertions of jurisdiction in personam is
simple and straightforward. It is premised on recognition that "[t]he phrase,
'judicial jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customary elliptical way of referring to
jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing." Restatement (Second)
of Conflict Laws § 56, Introductory Note (1971) (hereinafter Restatement).
This recognition leads to the conclusion that in order to justify an exercise
of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify
exercising "jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing." The
standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the
interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum-
contacts standard elucidated in International Shoe.10 2
Equally important was the Court's determination that the fiction relied upon in
the past was no longer necessary.'0° The expansion of in personam jurisdiction
after International Shoe,' coupled with the right to enforce judgments under
the full faith and credit clause,' provided plaintiffs with the tools needed to
deal effectively with elusive defendants.
Despite the sweep of its opinion and its manifest desire to look beyond
particularized problems in shaping a rule of general application, the Court did
recognize that certain refinements in the application of the standard would be
necessary. In addition, efforts to apply the broad rule of Shaffer to other fact
situations will almost certainly result in both exceptions to and extensions of the
rule announced. Any attempt to predict with certainty and to describe in detail
possible minor variations from Shaffer's major theme would be unwise. For
present purposes, it is enough to highlight a few of the most basic aspects of the
new jurisdictional structure which has been created.
1. Property Ownership as a "Contact"
In eliminating the "power over property" half of the Pennoyer framework,
the Court limited the importance which might be attached to property owner-
ship in the jurisdictional inquiry. The limitation is a significant one, but it should
not be confused with an absolute ban. Property ownership will no longer auto-
matically confer jurisdiction of any type. Ownership of property within a state
is, however, a contact with that state which should be considered when a court
is deciding whether or not it would be fair to exercise jurisdiction over the owner.
The significance of property ownership as a contact will vary from case to
case. The Shaffer Court made this clear by drawing a sharp contrast between
two categories of cases.' "[W]hen claims to the property itself are the source of
102 433 U.S. at 207.
103 This thought had also been expressed by Mr. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion
in North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 610 n.1 (1975).
104 The Court notes this expansion in 433 U.S. at 204.
105 See the Court's discussion in 433 U.S. at 210.
106 The Court also made reference to a third type of case, which fits somewhere between
the other two. In this third type of case, jurisdiction might exist, even though title to the
seized property was not in issue, because of the close relationship between the seized property
and the underlying disputes. "The presence of property may also favor jurisdiction in cases, such
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the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be
unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction." '
With respect to in rem actions,"'8 therefore, the theoretical change brought about
by Shaffer is unlikely to lead to a different practical result. The right to exercise
jurisdiction existed in the past, and it continues to exist today. With respect to
quasi in rem actions,'0 9 in which the property seized to create jurisdiction is com-
pletely unrelated to the underlying claim, however, the change in theory also
leads to a "significant change" in practical result."0 In such cases, "the presence
of the property alone would not support the State's jurisdiction.""' In the
absence of other ties "among the defendant, the State, and the litigation" the
case cannot proceed."
2
The Court justified this difference in treatment, in part, by noting the forum
state's strong interest in providing a procedure by which disputes concerning the
right to possess property located in the state could be peacefully resolved... and
by noting that litigation convenience would probably also be served by permitting
the action to proceed there."' Focusing more specifically on the defendant's
minimum contacts, the test of International Shoe, the Court stated that in an
in rem action, "the defendant's claim to property located in the State would
normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State's protection of his
interest.""' This statement, though undoubtedly true, does not set forth a
particularly persuasive reason for differentiating between in rem and quasi in
rem actions. Presumably the defendant in a quasi in rem action also expects to
benefit from the state's protection of his interest in the property located in the
state.
The crucial difference between an in rem action and a quasi in rem action
is not a difference in the quality or nature of the defendant's tie to the state.
Absent other contacts, the tie is identical-ownership of property. The key dif-
ference is, instead, a difference in the nature of the obligation being extracted
from the defendant as a result of that tie. In an in rem action, the property
owner, who has benefited from the state's protection of his interest in the property,
as suits for injury suffered on the land of an absentee owner, where the defendant's ownership
of the property is conceded but the cause of action is otherwise related to rights and duties
growing out of that ownership." 433 U.S. at 208. Specific reference was made to Dubin v.
Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938).
107 Id. at 207.
108 As used here, the term "in rem"' refers to an action in which the court's jurisdiction
depends upon the court's exercise of control over the defendant's property and in which the
property seized is somehow related to the plaintiff's claim. See note I1 supra. This is a broader
meaning than the Court gives to the term. The actions described would include both "in rem"
and "quasi in rem of the first type" as those terms are used by the Court. See 433 U.S. at 199
n.17 and 433 U.S. at 207 n.24.
109 As used here, the term "quasi in rem" refers to an action in which the court's jurisdic-
tion depends upon the court's exercise of control over the defendant's property at the com-
mencement of the action but in which the property seized is unrelated to the plaintiff's claim.
See note 11 supra. This is a somewhat narrower meaning than the Court gives to the term. The
actions described would include only "quasi in rem of the second type" as those terms are
used by the Court. See 433 U.S. at 199 n.17.
110 433 U.S. at 208.
111 Id. at 209.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 208.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 207-08.
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is being asked to participate in litigation directly related to that property. In a
quasi in rem action, on the other hand, though the protection is the same, the
obligation is much broader. The defendant must respond in the forum state to
claims totally unrelated to the property even though his only tie to the state is
ownership of that property and his only benefit from the state is protection of
that property.
For the Court to approve the former and reject the latter seems fair, and
fairness is the key under International Shoe. It is also totally consistent with
developments in the law of in personam jurisdiction after International Shoe.
Under International Shoe jurisdiction may properly be exercised in two basic
situations. One is where the defendant's ties to the forum state are so extensive
that he can be required to defend in that state against any claim that might be
asserted against him, whether or not it is related to his ties to the stute.11 The
single contact that exists as a result of property ownership would not be enough
to trigger this kind of "general jurisdiction." The other is where the defendant's
ties to the forum state are more limited, but the claim being asserted relates
directly to those ties.1" In such a case, the court may possess the "limited juris-
diction" necessary to consider the claim arising from the defendant's contacts
with the forum state.
The extension of these principles to cases traditionally grounded in "power
over property" leads to obvious results. A court considering what has been
known in the past as an in rem action possesses the limited jurisdiction over a de-
fendant claiming an interest in local property to resolve disputes relating to that
interest in property. A court considering what has been known in the past as a
quasi in rem action does not possess the general jurisdiction over a defendant
claiming an interest in local property to resolve disputes wholly unrelated to that
interest in property.1 s
116 See 326 U.S. at 317-18 and the text accompanying note 130 infra.
117 Id.
118 Drawing the line between in rein and quasi in rem will not always be easy. This is
particularly true when a court is confronted with a case fitting within the third category
referred to by the Court. That category includes cases where the underlying dispute somehow
relates to the property seized, but does not involve conflicting claims of title to the property.
See note 106 supra. In such cases, according to the Court, the single contact of property own-
ership might be sufficient to sustain the exercise of jurisdiction.
Since the Court's decision in Shaffer, there has been considerable speculation concerning
the continued validity of New York's "Seider-Simpson" doctrine, which is discussed at note 51
supra. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 90. The most significant judicial decisions to date have
all upheld this "sui generis" method of obtaining jurisdiction.
The continued validity of Seider was upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving, 579 F.2d 194- (2d Cir. 1978). The defendant's petition for
certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court over the strong dissent of Justices Powell and
Blackmun, who concluded that "the rationale of our recent decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977), is at odds with the decision of the Court of Appeals here." 47 U.S.L.W.
3387 (Dec. 5, 1978). Seider was also upheld by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Savchuk v.
Rush, 47 U.S.L.W. 2290 '(Oct. 20, 1978) and by the New York Court of Appeals in Baden v.
Staples, 47 U.S.L.W. 2291 (Oct. 24, 1978). The Savchuk decision presents particularly
interesting possibilities for review since the Supreme Court, on the day that Shaffer was
decided, vacated an earlier judgment in that case which upheld the Seider doctrine and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of Shaffer. 433 U.S. at 902. Certiorari has
been granted. 47 U.S.L.W. 3543 (Feb. 20, 1979)
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2. The Traditional Bases for In Personam Jurisdiction
The Court's mandate that "all assertions of state court jurisdiction" be tested
against the standards of International Shoe would seem to have implications that
extend beyond jurisdiction based upon "power over property." As was discussed
earlier,"1 9 International Shoe and its minimum contacts test supplemented, but
did not replace, already existing bases for the exercise of jurisdiction. The tra-
ditional bases for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction in this country have
been: defendant's presence, defendant's domicile, and defendant's consent.'20
Jurisdiction based upon either presence or consent becomes problematical when
measured against International Shoe.
Jurisdiction based upon presence includes what has come to be known as
"transient jurisdiction." One side of the Pennoyer rule for in personam jurisdic-
tion was its requirement that the defendant be served with process while present in
the forum state."' The flip side of this rule was the .recognition that if the
defendant has been served with process while present in the forum state the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction would always be proper. "Transient juris-
diction" refers to the use of this "other side" of Pennoyer to procure jurisdiction
over a defendant who may be only fleetingly present in the forum state.
The application of transient jurisdiction has led to particularly bizarre juris-
dictional results. 2' Certainly the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant solely
because he is served with process while passing through the state is no more fair
than the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant solely because he owns
property in the state. After Shaffer, the analysis utilized should be very similar to
that described for cases where there is property ownership: presence in the state
may be one contact to be considered but it should not be viewed as conclusively
establishing jurisdiction."'
Jurisdiction based upon consent is not as blatantly repugnant to the stand-
ards of fairness, but it can present serious problems nonetheless. A decision to
voluntarily submit to jurisdiction after the action has been commenced would
seem to create no real difficulties. The concept of an implied consent prior to the
commencement of the action has, on the other hand, been used in the past in a
way which masked consideration of the real issues in much the same way that
the concept of "corporate presence" did. The International Shoe Court spe-
cifically questioned the value of consent as a jurisdictional test.
True, some of the decisions holding the corporation amenable to suit
have been supported by resort to the legal fiction that it has given its consent
119 See the text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
120 See note 27 supra.
121 See the text accompanying note 20 supra.
122 Two modern examples of poor jurisdictional results based upon the transient rule are
Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) and Nielson v. Braland, 264 Minn.
481, 119 N.W.2d 737 (1963).
123 Mr. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, indicated that, in contrast to jurisdiction
based upon the seizure of a stock obligation, "If I visit another State, . . . I knowingly
assume some risk that the State will exercise its power over . . . my person while there. My
contact with the State, though minimal, gives rise to predictable risks." 433 U.S. at 218.
Whether this means that Mr. Justice Stevens would not find "transient jurisdiction" unfair is
unclear.
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to service and suit, consent being implied from its presence in the state
through the acts of its -authorized agents. But more realistically it may be
said that those authorized acts were of such a nature as to justify the
fiction.
1 24
The principles of Shaffer would seem to require that this message from Inter-
national Shoe be heeded. There is, however, language in Shaffer suggesting the
continued validity of implied consent as a basis for jurisdiction." 5
3. "Exceptional" Cases
Finally, the Court also recognized that, despite the breadth of its language,
there are certain types of cases in which the application of the International Shoe
standards would not be totally satisfactory. The Court made specific reference to
jurisdiction based upon status,"2 6 as is common in the family law area, and to
"jurisdiction by necessity" ' as possible exceptions. All rules have their excep-
tions. That Shaffer should also have exceptions is not surprising.
Even with these limitations, the Shaffer decision marks the true arrival of the
"Age of International Shoe." The Shaffer decision converts "minimum contacts"
from a theory of special application into a theory of general application. 8 That
theory then supplants what was left of Pennoyer. With few exceptions, Inter-
national Shoe represents the standard by which future exercises of state court
jurisdiction must be measured.
IV. The Minimum Contacts Standard
A. The Nature of the Problem: McGee v. Hanson
To herald the complete arrival of the "Age of International Shoe" is not to
proclaim the end of difficulties in the jurisdictional area, however. The extension
by Shaffer of the test of International Shoe to the traditional categories of in rem
and quasi in rem jurisdiction is clearly progress. It is important, nonetheless, to
keep the nature of that progress in mind.
With respect to the evolution of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, we
are no longer buried in mechanical, and perhaps meaningless, inquiries. We are,
in short, to the point of asking the right question: Are traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice offended by the exercise of jurisdiction by this court
over this defendant in this case? The sobering reality is that the point of asking
the correct question-this same question-was reached with respect to in
personam jurisdiction over thirty years ago, but basic problems have remained.
The International Shoe Court itself seemed sensitive to one major difficulty
when describing the minimum contacts test.
124 326 U.S. at 318 (citations omitted).
125 The Court, in deciding that jurisdiction could not properly be exercised over the
defendants, specifically referred to the fact that Delaware "has not enacted a statute that treats
acceptance of a directorshin as consent to jurisdiction in the State." 433 U.S. at 216.
126 433 U.S. at 208 n.30.
127 433 U.S. at 211 n.37.
128 The limited scope of the minimum contacts theory created by International Shoe has
been noted. See the text accompanying notes 35-37 supra. "A general theory such as Pen-
noyer's is not displaced by one of merely special application." Hazard, supra note 8, at 242.
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It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line
between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit,
and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The
test is not merely, as has sometimes been suggested, whether the activity,
which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its agent in another
state, is a little more or a little less. Whether due process is satisfied must
depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the
due process clause to insure.
129
The problem alluded to is the not uncommon problem of dealing with legal
standards that can fairly be characterized as vague. It is not an insurmountable
problem and is a problem for which certain basic guidelines emerge from the
International Shoe opinion itself.
Fundamental fairness to the defendant is the key under the fourteenth amend-
ment, and fundamental fairness is to be measured in terms of the defendant's
contacts with the forum state. The defendant's contacts are chosen as the
standard of measurement because of a "give-and-take" concept of fairness. If
the defendant "exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state,"
the defendant extracts certain benefits from the state, and, to the extent that the
defendant has beneficial ties to a state it may not be unjust to ask him to account
for his civil sins there.1 ' Simply examining the defendant's ties to the forum
state is not, by itself, enough, however. Some consideration must also be given
to the relationship between those contacts and the claim which is being sued
upon.
By taking these two factors and applying them to earlier cases, the Supreme
Court in International Shoe was able to describe four basic categories of cases and
to give some indication of where cases of each type would fit along the minimum
contacts continuum. Where the defendant's activities within the forum state
"have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities
sued upon," for example, the exercise of jurisdiction will be proper. On the other
hand, "single or isolated items of activity in a state" by the defendant "are not
enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities
there." Jurisdiction may or may not exist, depending upon the particular facts,
where there are either continuous and systematic contacts coupled with a cause
of action which is entirely distinct from those activities or where there are single
or occasional acts combined with a related claim."1
129 326 U.S. at 319 (citations omitted).
130 See the language of the Court quoted in the text accompanying notes 27-31 supra. One
commentator has expressed the belief that the use of the two terms "fundamental fairness" and
"minimiam contacts" has split courts into two different camps, each applying International
Shoe in a different way. One camp emphasizes fairness, while the other emphasizes the "mini-
mum contacts" language and searches primarily for physical contacts of the defendant with the
forum state. See Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?,
26 KAN. L. REv. 61 (1977).
The language of the Court, however, seems clearly to indicate that while fundamental
fairness is the key under the fourteenth amendment, minimum contacts are the test by which
such fairness will be measured. The two terms work together rather than being at odds. There
is also nothing in the opinion dictating that the minimum contacts referred to must be physical
contacts.
131 See the Court's discussion in 326 U.S. at 317-19.
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A framework for decision thus begins to emerge. That framework continues
to be grounded in elusive concepts which are difficult to apply. At least the gen-
eral direction for a proper inquiry has been indicated, however. Further certainty
can be obtained only through "a technique of particularization,"'3 2 or, as Judge
Learned Hand put it, "[W]e can do no more than follow the decided cases. '1C3
Those cases to which the most attention must be paid are, of course, sub-
sequent cases decided by the United States Supreme Court itself. Between Inter-
national Shoe and Shaffer the two most important Supreme Court opinions deal-
ing with problems of state court jurisdiction were McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co." 4 and Hanson u. Denckla."5 Unfortunately, those cases did little
other than to further muddy already murky waters. In fact, the irreconcilable
nature of these two opinions suggests a conflict more fundamental than a simple
disagreement over how minimum contacts should be measured, as important as
that might be.'
In Mc Gee the Court seemed intent upon taking the law of jurisdiction even
further down the road which had been opened in International Shoe. The McGee
opinion articulates very clearly an expansive philosophy of state court jurisdiction.
Looking back over this long history of litigation .a trend is clearly dis-
cernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over
foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to
the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years.
Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may
involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing national-
ization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business
conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modem transportation
and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued
to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.'
3 7
This language quoted is not inconsistent with International .Shoe. Certainly the
International Shoe Court recognized the trend toward expanding the scope of
state court jurisdiction over non-resident defendants and understood the pressures
which had fueled this expansion.
Even the result in McGee could be described as a rather straightforward
holding that the minimum contacts test can be satisfied by contacts which are
very minimal indeed.' 38 Such a holding was not required by the Court's decision
132 This term is used in Hazard, supra note 8, at 283.
133 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930). See note 32 supra.
134 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
135 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
136 The clash between McGee and Hanson is not primarily a clash between "results."
Factual distinctions can be drawn between the two cases, and the minimum contacts test is
vague enough to permit arguments that the results of the cases are consistent. The true clash
between the cases arises from their conflicting descriptions of the test to be applied and the
conflicting views of the constitutional limitations in state court jurisdiction which those de-
scriptions reflect.
137 355 U.S. at 222-23.
138 In McGee the Supreme Court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction by a California state
court over a non-California corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. The
plaintiff sought a recovery under a policy of insurance issued by the defendant on the life of
plaintiff's son. Defendant refused to pay, claiming that death had resulted from suicide.
Both the plaintiff and her deceased son were apparently residents of California. De-
fendant had no offices or agents in California and was not shown to have ever solicited or
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in International Shoe because of the rather substantial ties between the defendant
corporation and the State of Washington." 9 The exercise of jurisdiction in
International Shoe would presumably have been upheld under the jurisdictional
theories which preceded the minimum contacts test. 4 The same cannot be said
about McGee. At the very least, then, McGee reveals another key characteristic
of the minimum contacts test. The first was that it "puts the real question."''
The second is that it possesses the potential for expanding state court jurisdiction
by requiring less in terms of contact between the defendant and the forum state.
"Corporate presence" and "doing business," the very words used as labels to
describe earlier tests, conjure up images of activities more extensive than those
which might accurately be referred to as "minimum contacts." The McGee
result underscores the significance of this change in terminology.
There are, however, certain aspects of McGee which could be read as
providing the foundation for an even more basic retooling of International Shoe
and the minimum contacts test. The shift in focus away from concerns with
state sovereignty is stressed in the language of McGee. State lines apparently
retain any significance only as a means of generally measuring the inconvenience
caused the defendant by the conduct of the litigation away from his home. In-
convenience to the defendant, which the Supreme Court in International Shoe
had recognized as being "relevant" to the application of the minimum contacts
test.42 appears to become the very justification for the existence of that test in
McGee. And since modern transportation and communication have largely
blunted defendant's claims of inconvenience, the continued vitality of the mini-
mum contacts test itself is called into question. The defendant's ties to the forum
state may no longer be crucial, or even very important, in ascertaining whether
or not the fourteenth amendment's test of fairness has been met.
The McGee opinion does much to suggest that this is the case. In what is
a very short opinion to begin with, the Court spends relatively little time dis-
cussing the relationship between the defendant and the forum state. Given such
limited contacts,'43 the absence of more extended discussion is not only under-
standable but was unavoidable. Forced to look elsewhere, the Court relied upon
the limited nature of the defendant's inconvenience, the fact that the defendant
was provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard, and other "compelling"
factors not related to the defendant's ties with the state in upholding the exercise
of jurisdiction.'4 4
The most telling sentence in the opinion is the Court's declaration that "[i]t
is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which
done any insurance business in California, apart from the policy giving rise to the lawsuit.
That policy had originally been written by another insurance company. Defendant assumed the
obligations of that company and offered coverage to plaintiff's son by mailing a reinsurance
certificate to him in California. He accepted, and until his death mailed all premiums to
defendant in Texas from his California home. 355 U.S. at 220-23.
139 See note 30 supra.
140 See notes 25 and 30 supra.
141 See notes 32 and 33 supra.
142 See 326 U.S. at 317.
143 See note 138 supra.
144 See 355 U.S. at 223-24.
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had substantial connection with that State."' 45 Note that the important tie is the
tie between the contract and the state, not the tie between the defendant and the
state. The two are not necessarily the same. In fact, in assessing the strength of
the connection between the contract and the forum state, the Court in McGee
emphasized the plaintiff's interest in litigating the contract questions at home, the
state's interests in providing the resident plaintiff with a forum, and general con-
siderations of trial convenience.
The most significant feature of McGee is that it seems to invite state courts
to engage in this type of far-ranging inquiry in determining whether traditional
notions of fairness would be violated by the exercise of jurisdiction in a particular
case. The inquiry is one which may extend far beyond an examination of the
defendant's contacts with the forum state. It is an inquiry which can, therefore,
be used to generate alternative bases for the exercise of jurisdiction when
significant contacts between the defendant and the forum state do not exist. It is
in this sense that McGee most dramatically diverges from International Shoe.
In Hanson, which was decided later in the same term, however, the Court
abruptly called into question the trend toward jurisdictional expansion which had
been described by the opinion in McGee and which had been furthered by the
decision in that case.
But it is a mistake to assume that this trend [the one described in McGee]
heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of
state courts. Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from
inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal the
burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called
upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal contacts" with that State that
are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.146
Inconvenience to the defendant is not the sole concern. The need for a suitable
relationship between the defendant and the forum state transcends the issue of
convenience.
This relationship between the defendant and the state is not one, according
to Hanson, which must be present only in those cases where no other factors exist
which would justify the exercise of jurisdiction.
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a non-
resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of
the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.
147
The importance of the defendant's ties is, thus, reaffirmed, and the lack of ac-
ceptable substitutes for those ties is emphasized in another portion of the opinion
when the Court said: "[A state] does not acquire that jurisdiction by being the
145 355 U.S. at 223.
146 357 U.S. at 251 (citations omitted).
147 Id. at 253.
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'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litiga-
tion. The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law. It is resolved in this
case by considering the acts of the trustee [defendant].""148 The Court then
proceeded to find the exercise of jurisdiction by the state court to be inappropri-
ate, even though the contacts between the transaction and the forum state were at
least arguably stronger than those present in McGee.' 9
A great deal of effort has been expended in simply trying to reconcile these
two opinions. On balance, however, it seems clearly to have been the common
assumption that McGee was more representative of the Court's thinking on the
limits of jurisdiction and that the language of Hanson, suggesting that more
stringent standards were in order, could largely be dismissed either because of
Hanson's unusual facts... or because Hanson was, after all, a 5-4 decision.'
Certainly, the language of Hanson was not taken seriously by the many state court
cases which dutifully quoted from the opinion and then proceeded to expand the
boundaries of permissible state court jurisdiction further and further.' By not
only ruling that minimum contacts was the governing test in Shaffer but by going
a step beyond in applying the minimum contacts test to the facts of that case, the
Supreme Court created for itself the opportunity to settle once and for all the
"dispute" between McGee and Hanson and to further clarify the standards first
articulated in International Shoe.
148 Id. at 254.
149 In Hanson the Court held invalid the exercise of jurisdiction by the state courts of
Florida in a case in which the validity of the exercise of a power of appointment under a trust
was called into question. Crucial to the Court's holding in the case were the assumption that
under Florida law the trustee was an indispensable party and the finding that the Florida courts
could not properly exercise jurisdiction over the trustee.
The trustee was a Delaware trust company, and the settlor of the trust was, at the time of
its creation, a resident of Pennsylvania. She subsequently moved to Florida, however, and was
a resident of that state both at the time of the exercise of the power of appointment and at
the time of her death. Throughout this period, she maintained contact with the trustee in
Delaware from her home in Florida. Despite the fact that the transaction and all of the other
litigants had substantial ties to Florida, the Court held that jurisdiction over the trustee could
not be acquired in Florida and that the action could not proceed in the trustee's absence under
Florida law.
150 The result in Hanson would generally be considered to be the "fair" result. That is, it
resulted in a fairly equal distribution of the decedent's assets amongst her daughters and their
families. A contrary result would have completely "cut off" one daughter.
151 Mr. justice Black, who wrote the majority opinion in McGee, was one of the dissenters
in Hanson. This should not be surprising, since it was Mr. Justice Black who, in a separate
opinion, in International Shoe stated, "I believe that the Federal Constitution leaves to each
State, without any 'ifs' or 'buts,' a power to tax and to open the doors of its courts for its
citizens to sue corporations whose agents do business in those States." 326 U.S. at 324. See
note 34 supra.
152 See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal. 2d 893,
458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969), an action seeking damages in California from an Ohio
manufacturer. Plaintiff alleged that he had been injured as the result of an explosion in
California involving a tank manufactured by defendant in Ohio. The Court first cites Hanson
for the proposition that jurisdiction will not be proper unless the defendant has purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the state. The court then proceeds,
however, to rule that unless defendant can show that its tank arrived in California in a
fortuitous and unforeseeable manner, purposeful availment will be assumed.
See also Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961); Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg., 267 Minn. 56, 124
N.W.2d 824 (1963); and Andersen v. National Presto Indus., 257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639
(1965). The tendency of state courts to follow McGee is at least in part probably the result of
the Hanson Court's failure to in any way disavow the breadth of the McGee language.
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B. Shaffer v. Heitner and Kulko v. Superior Court: Hanson v. Denckla
on the Rise
Those who would conclude that the Shaffer Court was totally equal to this
task are probably few in number. In the first three sections of the majority opin-
ion, Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, dealt with the "power over
property" problem. He described both the background of the particular case
before the Court and the growth of the American law of jurisdiction generally
and rendered the ruling that all exercises of state court jurisdiction must be evalu-
ated according to the standards of International Shoe. While these sections do
leave certain questions unanswered,' they are generally straightforward, and
they prompted no dissent." 4 In part IV of the opinion the majority applies the
standards of International Shoe to the facts of the Shaffer case.' It is at this
point that both the quality and tone of the majority opinion deteriorate some-
what,.. and it is this portion of the opinion which sparked a sharp dissent from
Mr. Justice Brennan.
Even though the road becomes a bit rockier, however, the journey through
part IV can be very informative. In fact, when read together, part IV of the
Shaffer opinion and Mr. Justice Marshall's later efforts on behalf of the Court
in Kulko v. Superior Court of California.7 shed considerable light on a re-
curring and significant problem-the problem of applying the minimum contacts
test of International Shoe in other cases. The light cast by Shaffer and Kulko
strongly suggests a reaffirmance by the Court of jurisdictional principles that
might have been thought by some to be outdated.""
In certain key respects, the disagreement between the majority and the dis-
sent in Shaffer is merely a continuation of the thirty-year-old war between McGee
and Hanson. While it does not emerge unscathed," 9 Hanson clearly emerges as
153 See the text accompanying notes 106-25 supra.
154 Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Stevens, in separate concurring opinions, did
clarify their positions with respect to matters disposed of in parts I, II and III of the ma-
jority's opinion.
155 One of the key problems with part IV of the opinion, at least in the mind of the one
dissenting justice, is the absence of a factual record adequate to permit the application of the
standards of International Shoe to the facts of the Shaffer case. See Mr. Jusice Brennan's dis-
cussion in 433 U.S. at 221-22.
156 Problems with the quality of the opinion will be discussed throughout this section.
The tone for part IV of the majority's opinion seems to be set by the introductory observation
that "[ajppellee Heitner did not allege and does not now claim that appellants have ever set foot
in Delaware." 433 U.S. at 213. Physically setting foot in the forum state has not, of course,
been thought to be a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction by that state for some time.
Thera are some who might say that this is a regression all too typical of part IV of the
opinion.
157 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
158 The Shaffer Court cites numerous authorities in support of its decision to eliminate
"power over property" as a permissible basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. 433 U.S. at 205.
Interestingly, many of those same authorities also express hopes or predictions for the future
development of in personam jurisdiction. More often than not, however, the course chosen by
the Court in part IV is not the course that was suggested by these same authorities whose
advice was followed in parts I, II, and III.
159 At least one aspect of Hanson is undermined by the opinion in Shaffer. Hanson had, in
some respects, seemed to maintain a hold on the notions of sovereignty which were the under-
pinnings of the Pennoyer framework for state court jurisdiction. Shaffer reemphasized the shift
in concern from sovereignty to fairness in the law of jurisdiction and, in a footnote, declared
that nothing in Hanson "is to the contrary." 433 U.S. at 204 n.20.
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the winner of the Shaffer battle. That victory is repeated in Kulko and is em-
bodied in two basic principles of personal jurisdiction which were revitalized by
the Supreme Court in those cases.
1. A preference favoring the defendant remains an essential feature of the
American law of jurisdiction.
The history of the American law of jurisdiction has been a history of ever-
increasing choices for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' options have been continually ex-
panded as courts have subjected defendants to in personam jurisdiction in a wider
and wider range of forums. The most visible evidence of this pattern has been
the periodic creation by the Supreme Court of exceptions to the strict requirement
of defendant presence laid down in Pennoyer. The most dramatic change of this
nature came with the introduction of the minimum contacts test in International
Shoe.' Less obvious, but also important, has been the tendency of courts in
recent years to apply the test of International Shoe in a manner which minimizes
the relative significance of the ties, or lack of ties, between the defendant and the
forum state.
There are those who have suggested, with force to their arguments, that the
logical end point for this trend should be a system of jurisdiction in which the
historical preference favoring defendants would be eliminated." 1 Within such
a system, the plaintiff could, at least in certain circumstances, force the defendant
to come to him, even in the absence of any significant contact by the defendant
with the forum state. The problem is, therefore, a problem which includes but
goes beyond the manner of measuring the defendant's "minimum contacts."
The ultimate question is whether those contacts are necessary at all, or
whether the exercise of jurisdiction can properly be justified by reliance upon
other factors. Under a true "interest analysis" standard, not weighted in favor of
any party, the defendant's contacts with the forum state would be only one of
many factors that might be considered by the court in determining whether the
forum is a proper one. Other considerations would include the interest of the
plaintiff in suing at home and the interest of a state in providing a forum within
which its citizen plaintiffs could sue and within which state interests could be
vindicated. The fairness standard would not focus on the defendant but would
be applied more generally. The strongest Supreme Court support for taking this
final step and eliminating the traditional preference favoring defendants can be
found in the language of McGee.'62 The biggest impediment to this development
has been Hanson.'63
160 Other changes to the structure had come before International Shoe. The traditional
bases for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction included not only the presence test articulated
in Pennoyer but also domicile and consent. See note 27 supra.
161 Two of the most influential articles dealing with problems of jurisdiction are von
Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv.
1121 (1966) and Hazard, supra note 8. Each of these articles contains this suggestion, though
it is asserted most directly in von Mehren & Trautman, where the authors, in their own
words, "recur to this theme of movement away from the bias favoring the defendant toward
permitting the plaintiff to insist that the defendant come to him." 79 HARV. L. REV. at 1128.
162 See the text accompanying notes 138-45 supra.
163 See the text accompanying notes 146-48 supra.
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Mr. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Shaffer, clearly cast his lot with
McGee. In discussing the issue before the Court, he emphasized the close rela-
tionship between jurisdiction and choice-of-law and stated, "[i]n either case an
important linchpin is the extent of contacts between the controversy, the parties,
and the forum State."'6 4 This formulation of the jurisdictional inquiry provided
him with the latitude to consider not only the defendants' minimum contacts but
the interests of the plaintiff and of the forum state as well, and consider them, he
did. In fact, the bulk of his argument is directly dependent upon two contentions,
neither of which relates to the defendants or their contacts.
The first is that the derivative action was brought not for the benefit of the
named plaintiff, who was a virtual stranger to the forum state, but for the benefit
of the corporation chartered in Delaware. 6 ' The significance of a resident
plaintiff's desire to litigate in his home state was recognized in McGee... and has
been relied upon in later cases as well.1 7 The second is that Delaware, as the
state of incorporation, had an "unusually powerful interest" in providing a forum
for this litigation which involved allegations of corporate mismanagement."' 8
Again, state interests were utilized to justify the approval of jurisdiction in
McGee, as well as in other cases."6 9 Mr. Justice Brennan's brief discussion of the
defendants' contacts with the State of Delaware appears to have been "tacked
on" at the end of his opinion.
164 433 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added). At another point in his opinion, Mr. Justice
Brennan asserts: "The primary teaching of Parts I-III of today's decision is that a State, in
order to assert jurisdiction over a person located outside its borders, may do so only on the
basis of minimum contacts among the parties, the contested transaction, and the forum State."
433 U.S. at 220.
165 433 U.S. at 222.
166 In justifying its decision that California could require the defendant insurer to litigate
in California, the Supreme Court in McGee referred to the problems that might be created for
plaintiffs if the local forum were not available.
These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the
insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable. When
claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the
cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the company
judgment proof.
355 U.S. at 223.
167 See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal. 2d 893,
458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1968); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Cf. Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812
(2d Cir. 1969) (Seider/Simpson attachment applies only to N.Y. plaintiff); Liquid Carriers
Corp. v. American Marine Corp., 375 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1967) (N.Y. has an interest in pro-
tecting rights of N.Y. residents).
168 433 U.S. at 222. Justice Brennan went on to identify three interrelated public policies
of Delaware which would be furthered by its exercise of jurisdiction in the case: 1) "[The]
interest in providing restitution for its local corporations that allegedly have been victimized
by fiduciary misconduct"; 2) "state courts have legitimately read their jurisdiction expansively
when a cause of action centers in an area in which the forum State possesses a amanifest
regulatory interest"; and 3) "a State like Delaware has a recognized interest in affording a
convenient forum for supervising and overseeing the affairs of an entity that is purely the
creation of that State's law." See 433 U.S. at 223.
169 The McGee Court stated: "It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest
in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay
claims." 355 U.S. at 223. The state's regulatory interest in McGee was evidenced by a special
jurisdictional statute designed to deal with out-of-state. insurers. Mr. justice Brennan gave
several further examples in which importance had been attached to such state interests. See
433 U.S. at 223-24.
170 Whether or not those contacts were of significant quality and quantity will be discussed
in the second half of this section. What is important at this point is ascertaining the degree of
attention these contacts received in the opinion relative to the attention afforded other factors.
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The majority in Shaffer, on the other hand, adopted a much narrower ap-
proach which focused on the perceived lack of significant contact between the
defendants and the forum state. The general message to be drawn from the
almost exclusive attention paid by the Court to the defendants' contacts is some-
what obscured by the Court's unfortunate inclination, in the first instance, to
either disregard or deny the existence of any other interests in the case. No
mention at all of the plaintiff's interest in a local forum is contained in the
majority opinion, and, according to the Court, any argument of a compelling
state interest "is undercut by the failure of the Delaware legislature to assert the
state interest" in a special long arm statute.171 To the extent that Shaffer can be
viewed simply as a case in which no factors other than defendant's contacts were
considered only because no other factors existed, it is, of course, not as helpful in
defining the proper scope of the jurisdictional inquiry. Despite some of the
ambiguity created by the Court itself, Shaffer is not such a case,"7 2 however, and
the clear messages which are transmitted in the majority opinion cannot prudently
be disregarded.'
The majority consistently asserted that the central concern in the application
of the minimum contacts test is "the relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation. ... ""' Particularly when compared with Mr. Justice Bren-
nan's statement of the factors to be considered,' this formulation seems to re-
emphasize the overriding importance of the defendants' contacts and to suggest
that the interests of the plaintiff are not worthy of consideration at all. Other
aspects of the opinion lend support to this reading.
The Court specifically based its decision upon one of the fundamental
teachings of International Shoe: "The Due Process Clause 'does not contem-
plate that a state may make binding a judgment . . . against an individual or
corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.
171 433 U.S. at 214. It is interesting to note that the Court, despite the strong objections of
Mr. Justice Brennan, proceeded to apply the minimum contacts test despite the absence of a
long arm statute. In the words of Mr. Justice Brennan, the Court was, therefore, proceeding
"to find that a minimum-contacts law that Delaware expressly denies having enacted also could
not be constitutionally applied in this case." In his view, "a purer example of an advisory
opinion is not to be found." 433 U.S. at 220.
The majority's decision to proceed in this case might be taken as one indication that as the
minimum contacts test has displaced more traditional bases for the exercise of jurisdiction and
become more the rule than the exception this particular function of the long arm has become
less important. More likely, the Court simply viewed the sequestration statute as an adequate
expression of the state's desire to act as the forum. Recent cases seem to support this latter
position. See Bethany Auto Sales, Inc. v. Aptco Auto Auction, 564 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1977)
(compliance with state long arm statute required) and Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry,
Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978) (combining sequestration statute and minimum contacts
test).
172 The other interests identified by Mr. Justice Brennan in his dissent cannot simply be dis-
missed. See note 168 supra. Even the majority seems to recognize that fact. Its first tactic is to
deny the existence of the other interests. It then, however, moves to a second stage of argu-
ment by asserting that even if such interests exist, they will not support the exercise of jurisdic-
tion. See 433 U.S. at 214-16.
173 It is particularly significant to note that the Supreme Court did in this case hurdle several
obstacles in getting to the minimum contacts problem and seemed eager to speak about minimum
contacts generally.
174 433 U.S. at 204 (emphasis added). See additional references to this test in 433 U.S. at
207 and 433 U.S. at 209.
175 See the text accompanying note 164 supra.
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International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S., at 319.' "17' Even if other
interests exist, that does not "demonstrate that Delaware is a fair forum for this
litigation."17 ' The importance of a defendant's contacts is underscored by a
direct quote from Hanson: "[The State] does not acquire . . . jurisdiction by
being the 'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location
for the litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law. It is
resolved in this case by considering the acts of the [appellants]. Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) ."178 This is but one of numerous references by
the Shaffer majority to Hanson. It is interesting, and helpful, to note that there
is, in contrast, not a single cite to McGee in the majority opinion.' This focus
on the Hanson concern for defendant's contacts continued in Kulko, although in
that opinion there were at least passing references to McGee.
The roots of the Kulko lawsuit are directly traceable to an earlier divorce.'
In 1972, after thirteen years of married life and the birth of two children, Ezra
Kulko and Sharon Kulko decided to separate. They had been domiciled in New
York throughout their married lives.' 8' At the time of the separation, Mrs.
Kulko left for California. She returned to New York to sign a separation agree-
ment and then went to Haiti to obtain a divorce. After getting the divorce, she
made California her home, was remarried, and took the name Horn.
Under the terms of the separation agreement, Kulko was given custody of
both children during the school year. They were, however, to spend Christmas,
Easter, and summer vacations with their mother in California. She was to
receive $3000 in annual child support to cover these vacation periods, but was to
receive no alimony or other support for herself.
In December of 1973 the Kulkos' eleven-year-old daughter, who was about
to leave for her Christmas vacation in California, advised her father that she
would prefer to stay in California after the vacation period. She desired, in effect,
to reverse the arrangement agreed to by her parents by living in California during
the school year and spending her vacations in New York. Her father acceded to
her wishes and bought her a one-way ticket to California. Three years later the
Kulkos' fifteen-year-old son decided to make the same kind of change. Rather
than speaking with his father, however, he telephoned his mother, and she sent
him a plane ticket to California. He began living with his mother there in
January of 1976.
Less than one month after his arrival, Sharon Kulko Horn commenced an
176 433 U.S. at 216.
177 433 U.S. at 215.
178 Id. It should be noted that in an earlier portion of the opinion, when the Court is still
dealing with the impact of its decision on cases traditionally brought in rem or quasi in rem,
reference is made to the state's interest as a proper consideration. See 433 U.S. at 207-08 and
the text accompanying notes 109-15 supra.
179 It is also somewhat interesting to note the similarities between the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Brennan in Shaffer and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Hanson.
180 The following description of the factual context from which Kulko sprung is inten-
tionally brief. A more complete statement of the facts can be found in 436 U.S. at 86-88.
181 It should be noted that the Kulkos were married in California. That, however, was a
matter of convenience. Both were domiciliaries of New York. They were married in California
while he was in the military service and had a stopover in that state on his way to Korea.
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action against Ezra Kulko in state court in California seeking to establish the
Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment, seeking to modify that judgment
to award her full custody of the children, and seeking to increase Ezra Kulko's
child support obligations. Kulko appeared specially and moved to dismiss on the
ground that the California court could not constitutionally exercise personal juris-
diction over him. He contested only the power of the court to act with respect to
the claim for increased child support.'82
His challenge was unsuccessful not only at the state trial court level but in
the California Court of Appeals8 3 and in the California Supreme Court. 84 as
well. Kulko had better luck with the United States Supreme Court. It reversed.
In dealing with the issues before it, the United States Supreme Court in Kulko
again demonstrated both a particular sensitivity to the need for defendant's
contacts with the forum state and a substantial fidelity to the teachings of Hanson.
This was not a case in which the strong interests that both the plaintiff and
the state had in obtaining approval of a local forum could easily be denied. As
a result, the Court's view as to the appropriate consideration to be given both
defendant's contacts and other factors emerges more clearly than it had in
Shaffer."5 Although the Court, as it had done in Shaffer, alluded to the fact that
the state's regulatory interest had not been asserted in a special jurisdictional
statute,' it conceded that "It cannot be disputed that California has substantial
interests in protecting resident children and in facilitating child support actions
on behalf of those children."'' 17 The existence of those interests did not prove to
be enough, however.
In the first place, according to the Court, these interests could be effectively
vindicated without subjecting the defendant to the jurisdiction of the California
courts.' In an interesting turnabout from McGee the Court relied upon modern
developments, in this case legislation, to undermine arguments that the interests
of the plaintiff and the state required a local forum. Up to this point such modern
182 "Appellant did not contest the court's jurisdiction for purposes of the custody determina-
tion .. " 436 U.S. at 88. Custody matters have, of course, traditionally been viewed as
"status" matters for purposes of jurisdiction, not requiring an application of the minimum
contacts test. The impact of Shaffer on this classification is not yet clear. See the text ac-
companying notes 126-27 supra.
183 Kulko v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 63 Cal. App. 3d 417, 133 Cal. Rptr. 627
(1976).
184 Kulko v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 586 (1977).
185 In discussing part IV of the majority's opinion in Shaffer, one commentator has stated:
"In all fairness, it would not be possible to characterize the majority opinion in this area as
better than muddled." Leathers, Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi in Rem Jurisdic-
tion, 66 KENT. L.J. 1, 20 (1977). The comment is hauntingly similar to one made a dozen
years earlier about the majority's opinion in Hanson. "In a 5 to 4 decision, Mr. Chief Justice
Warren reached the fair result, in favor of the executrix daughter, but by a line of analysis that
in all charity and after mature reflection is impossible to follow, no less to relate." Hazard, supra
note 8, at 244. The Court's communications problems in both opinions are substantial. None-
theless, when these two opinions are now read together, and when they are read in connection
with Kulko, basic messages can be extracted.
186 See 436 U.S. at 97-99.
187 Id. at 100.
188 "California's legitimate interest in ensuring the support of children resident in Cali-
fornia without unduly disrupting the children's lives, moreover, is already being served by the
State's participation in the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968." Id. at
97-99.
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developments had been utilized by courts almost exclusively to undermine de-
fendants' claims of a need to defend at home.'89
Even more important, the Court, after citing Shaffer, asserted that the
existence of other interests simply did not make California a fair forum.' The
language employed in Kulko to define the proper scope of the jurisdictional
inquiry is not as rigid as the language of Shaffer. The message is, nonetheless,
clear, and the heart of the Court's discussion of jurisdictional doctrine is helpful
enough to justify extensive quotation.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates as a
limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting
rights or interests of non-resident defendants. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 198-200, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 55 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977). It has long been
the rule that a valid judgment imposing a personal obligation or duty in
favor of the plaintiff may be entered only by a court having jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-733, 24
L. Ed. 565, 572 (1878) ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326
U.S., at 316, 66 S.Ct., at 158....
The parties are in agreement that the constitutional standard for de-
termining whether the State may enter a binding judgment against appellant
here is that set forth in this Court's opinion in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, supra: that a defendant "have certain minimum contacts with
[the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " 326 U.S., at 316,
66 S.Ct., at 158, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, supra, 311 U.S. at 463, 61 S.Ct.,
at 342. While the interests of the forum State and of the plaintiff in proceed-
ing with the cause in the plaintiff's forum of choice are of course to be con-
sidered, see McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78
S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1957), an essential criterion in all cases is
whether the "quality and nature" of the defendant's activity is such that it
is "reasonable" and "fair" to require him to conduct his defense in that State.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S., at 316-317, 319, 66
S.Ct. at 158, 159. Accord, Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, 433 U.S., at 207-212,
975 S.Ct., at- 2581-2584; Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445,
72 S.Ct. 413, 418, 96 L. Ed. 485 (1952)."91
The test described does not represent a departure from the past. It is, to the
contrary, a reaffirmation of lessons that can be easily extracted from past cases.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution places limitations on exercises of judicial jurisdiction by state courts.
This is a teaching of Pennoyer. The fourteenth amendment's limitations are im-
posed to protect defendants. As such, the defendant in every case must have had
contact with the forum state. These are teachings of International Shoe. Other
factors may be considered only as a part of the backdrop against which the
defendant's contacts are to be measured. Less may be required in terms of de-
fendant contacts with the forum state in a case involving compelling plaintiff or
state interests in a local forum. These other factors cannot, however, serve as a
189 See the text accompanying notes 134 and 142 supra.
190 436 U.S. at 100.
191 Id. at 91-92.
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substitute for the essential ties between the defendant and the forum state, which
must be present in each case. This is a teaching which was at least implicit in
International Shoe and which was explicitly expressed in Hanson.
In Kulko the Hanson brakes are applied once again to the McGee trend
toward a more expansive system of state court jurisdiction. It must be conceded
that neither Shaffer nor Kulko presents the strongest case for abandonment of
the preference favoring defendants. 9 ' Both Shaffer and Kulko are, however,
unwavering in their faithfulness to the basic tenet that jurisdictional restrictions
have been and are now imposed for the protection of defendants. If constitutional
limitations on jurisdiction exist for the protection of defendants, it may be some-
what incongruous to even speak of a "bias" which "favors" defendants. What-
ever terms are used, any movement toward a true "interest analysis," not focusing
primarily on defendant contacts, seems highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.
2. If the "minimum contacts" test is to be satisfied, the contacts of the defendant
with the forum state must be more than minimal contacts.
To refocus the jurisdictional inquiry on the defendant's contacts is to deal
with only the first half of the problem, however. Even when a court knows that
its primary responsibility is an evaluation of the defendant's contacts with the
forum state, it can encounter serious difficulties in the process of evaluation.
That is particularly true when the standards to be applied are as vague as the
standards of International Shoe. 9 ' The Supreme Court in Kulko described the
dilemma facing a court saddled with the task of determining the constitutionality
of an exercise of personal jurisdiction under International Shoe.
Like any standard that requires a determination of "reasonableness,"
the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe is not susceptible of
mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to
determine whether the requisite "affiliating circumstances" are present.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1235, 2 L.Ed. 2d
1283 (1958). We recognize that this determination is one in which few
answers will be written "in black and white. The grays are dominant and
even among them the shades are innumerable." Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S.
541, 545, 68 S.Ct. 1213, 1216, 92 L.Ed. 1561 (1948) .19
One way to deal with a problem of this type is to avoid it, and the Inter-
national Shoe test creates the opportunity to do just that. Courts being human
and human nature being what it is, it is perhaps unfortunate that the Supreme
Court in International Shoe chose to express its fundamental fairness test in terms
of "minimum contacts." It is simply too easy to equate "minimum" with "min-
imal" and to approve the exercise of jurisdiction whenever there is any arguable
192 The most complete and helpful discussion of when such an abandonment would be ap-
propriate is contained in von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 161. As regards Shaffer and
Kulko, it is sufficient to note that in neither case is a vast disparity between the parties'
economic strength or the parties' involvement in multistate activities established. It is also not
clear that Delaware and California would have been the most convenient forums.
193 See the text accompanying notes 33-35 and 129-35 supra.
194 436 U.S. at 92.
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contact, no matter how tenuous.19 It would have been necessary for the U.S.
Supreme Court to adopt a "minimal contacts" test to uphold the exercise of
jurisdiction by the California Court in Kulko. The Court refused to do so.
To fully understand Kulko, it is first necessary to understand what contacts
were thought not to be significant, even by the California courts which upheld
the exercise of jurisdiction. The California courts did not base their exercise of
jurisdiction upon: Kulko's stopovers in California in 1959 and 1960 while he
was in the service; his marriage to Sharon Kulko Horn in California in 1959
during one of those stopovers; or his agreement with his separated wife to permit
their children to visit her in California. The temporary stopovers in California
some sixteen years earlier, as well as the marriage ceremony in California, were
essentially fortuitous events resulting from Kulko's military travel schedule. The
claim for relief presently being litigated was also unrelated to those earlier
contacts, 9 ' thus making reliance upon tfiem even more questionable.'97 To rely
upon Kulko's agreement that his children could visit their mother in California
would have created serious "policy problems" and would have been inconsistent
with the holdings of other California cases.'
Instead, the California courts relied upon a California long arm statute
which permits the courts of that state to exercise jurisdiction in all cases in which
it would be constitutionally permissible to do so.'99 One of the bases for juris-
diction recognized by that statute is the "causing of an effect" in the state by an
act or omission which occurs elsewhere."' The California Supreme Court ap-
195 The term "affiliating circumstances," which was used in Hanson with respect to in
personam, in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, does not suffer from this problem. See 357 U.S.
at 245-46. The term is used by the Court in both Shaffer and Kulko, as is the term "minimum
contacts."
196 The Supreme Court does not directly assert that the marriage in California was
unrelated to the action for increased child support. Such a characterization would, however,
have been consistent with their holding in Shaffer that a director's ownership of Greyhound
stock was unrelated to a claim by Greyhound against that director for corporate mismanage-
ment. The Court did specifically characterize the earlier stopovers as being unrelated and went
on to state: "To hold such temporary visits to a State a basis for the assertion of in personam
jurisdiction over unrelated actions arising in the future would make a mockery of the limitationsi
on state jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment." 436 U.S. at 93.
197 It has been clear since International Shoe that unless the defendant's contacts with the
forum state are substantial enough to support the exercise of a "general jurisdiction" over him
there, there must be a relationship between the defendant's contacts with that state and the
claim being sued upon. The importance of this relationship has been emphasized in a number
of post-Shaffer cases. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. Ballas Liquidating Co., 572 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir.
1978) and Grevas v. M/V Olympic Pegasus, 557 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1977).
198 In Titus v. Superior Court of Contra Costa, 23 Cal.App.3d 792, 803, 100 Cal. Rptr.
477, 485 (1972), the court stated: "It is a strong policy of the law to encourage the visitation
of children with their parents. Such a policy should be fostered rather than thwarted." In
Judd v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.App. 3d 38, 45, 131 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249-50 (1976); the
court stated: "It should be a matter of strong public policy to encourage the payment of
support and communication between a natural father and his children, not to discourage the
same by subjecting the father to the expense and inconvenience of relitigating this matter of
support in our state." In each of these cases the California Court of Appeals found the
exercise of jurisdiction to be improper. They were distinguished by the California Supreme
Court in Kulko because Kulko sent his daughter to California knowing that she intended to
stay permanently.
199 CAL. Civ. Paoc. CoDr. § 410.10 (West) provides: "A court of this state may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution, of this state or of the United
States." The California court apparently felt that the state constitution imposed no obligations
in addition to those arising under the United States Constitution.
200 In the words of the California Supreme Court,. § 410.10 "includes all the recognized
bases of judicial jurisdiction." 564 P.2d at 355. The "causing an effect" basis is recognized not
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parently had no problem concluding that Kulko had caused an effect in Cali-
fornia by permitting his children to move there. That court was more troubled
by its recognition that "[i]t is at once apparent that the potential scope of this
basis of jurisdiction is almost unlimited since any act or omission of a defendant
anywhere in the world causing an 'effect' in California could theoretically sub-
ject him to in personam jurisdiction in California."" 1
The exercise of jurisdiction must, in short, not only fit within the applicable
long arm statute but must meet the tests of the federal Constitution as well. The
California Supreme Court, after alluding to International Shoe, applied the con-
stitutional test contained in Hanson, a test which, in their language, requires a
showing that "the nonresident 'purposely availed himself of the privilege of con-
ducting business in California or of the benefits and protections of California
laws... [or] anticipated that he would derive any economic benefit as a result of
his' act outside of California."2 °2 The court concluded that this constitutional
standard had been met.
Initially we observe that probably no parental act more fully invokes the
benefits and protections of California law than that by which a parent per-
mits his minor child to live in California. The parent thereby avails himself
of the total panoply of the state's laws, institutions and resources-its police
and fire protection, its school system, its hospital services, its recreational
facilities, its libraries and museums, to mention only a few. Therefore, we
start with the premise that a nonresident parent who allows his minor child
or children to reside in California has by that act purposely availed himself
of the benefits and protections of the laws of California to such an extent
that absent unusual circumstances or countervailing public policies such act
would support personal jurisdiction over the nonresident parent for actions
concerning the support of these children.
2 0 3
The United States Supreme Court was not so easily persuaded. The Court
first expressed its belief that the "causing an effect" basis for jurisdiction was not
intended to cover a situation like the one in Kulko. °4 The main thrust of the
Court's opinion, however, was directed to what it felt was a misapplication of the
constitutional standard of Hanson. It was International Shoe which justified the
minimum contacts test by relating it to benefits which were extracted from the
state.0  The extraction of benefits from the state could fairly carry with it the
only by the California courts but by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37
(1971) as well. That section of the Restatement provides:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who
causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of
action arising from these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual's
relationship to the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.
201 564 P.2d at 356.
202 564 P.2d at 356 (citations omitted). The California court's problems may have begun
with its formulation of the test to be applied. The Hanson language refers only to a "purpose-
ful availment" and does not provide for the anticipation of economic benefit as an alternative
justification for jurisdiction.
203 564 P.2d at 356.
204 "As is apparent from the examples accompanying § 37 in the Restatement, this section
was intended to reach wrongful activity outside of the State causing injury within the State,
see, e.g., Comment a, p. 157 (shooting bullet from one State into another), or commercial
activity affecting state residents, ibid." 436 U.S. at 96.
205 See the text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
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obligation of defending in the state."' It was the Hanson Court that explicitly
went one step further by announcing that "it is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State....
The United States Supreme Court's decision that these standards had not
been met in Kulko is straightforward. It is imperative that the defendant has
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the state.
It is not sufficient that the defendant has acquiesced in the decision of another
to conduct activities in the state. In this case the decision of the children to leave
was not a purposeful availment by the defendant." 8 It is imperative that the
defendant has received benefits from the forum state. It is not sufficient that
someone else has received benefits from that state. In this case any state law
benefits received were benefits received by the children and not by their father."0 9
It is imperative that any benefits received by the defendant be benefits received
from the forum state. It is not sufficient that general benefits with no real ties to
the laws of the forum state are received. In this case the defendant's economic
benefit from having lower child care costs springs not from the fact that his
children now live in California but instead from the fact that they no longer live
with him in New York.21
Kulko should have been an easy case for the Supreme Court. The extent to
which it was not is a tribute of sorts to McGee.2 ' The proper result in Shaffer v.
Heitner is not as obvious. Kulko and Shaffer are, as has been noted, cases in
which there was substantial agreement about the rules of law to be applied.
Shaffer is, in fact, one of the principal authorities relied upon in Kulko. Kulko
and Shaffer are also cases in which the same basic result-a determination that
a state court could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction-was reached. The
Shaffer facts, however, present a much stronger case for permitting the exercise
of jurisdiction, and the result in Shaffer is, therefore, much more susceptible to
valid criticism.21 It simply seems less clear that the result in Shaffer was dictated
206 See the text accompanying note 129 supra.
207 357 U.S. at 253. Nothing in this language from Hanson is inconsistent with the Inter-
national Shoe opinion. In fact, the language of International Shoe itself suggests that the ties
between the defendant and the State to be adequate ties for purposes of jurisdiction must have
been intentionally created by the defendant. The Court refers to a defendant who "exercises
the privilege of conducting activities within a state." 326 U.S. at 319. The Hanson "purpose-
ful availment" language, however, nails down the requirement that there be some volition on
the part of the defendant.
208 In the words of the Court, "A father who agrees, in the interests of family harmony and
his children's preferences, to allow them to spend more time in California than was required
under a separation agreement can hardly be said to have 'purposefully availed himself' of the
'benefits and protections' of California's laws." 436 U.S. at 94. With respect to the son, Kulko
did not even know before the fact that a move was being contemplated.
209 436 U.S. at 94 n.7.
210 It was the Court's view that "[a]ny diminution in appellant's household costs resulted, not
from the child's presence in California, but rather from her absence from appellant's home."
436 U.S. at 95. It is interesting to apply this view to McGee since the Court in that case
specifically mentioned that insurance premiums were mailed from California. Presumably any
benefit to the defendant in that case, however, resulted, not from their mailing in California,
but rather from their receipt in Texas.
211 Surprisingly, three Justices dissented in Kulko, while only Mr. Justice Brennan dissented
in Shaffer.
212 A number of commentators have expressed misgivings about the majority's minimum
contacts analysis in Shaffer, and one has gone so far as to conclude that "the Court was in-
correct in its conclusion that the directors lacked minimum contacts with Delaware in regard
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by the ultimate goal of ensuring that the defendant's treatment is consistent with
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." '213
The defendant in Kulko had not sought to gain economically from any com-
mercial dealings involving the state of California. 14 The dispute in question
related solely to his personal life. The defendant in Kulko had not intentionally
sought to improve his personal life through any dealings involving the state of
California. The defendant's own activities-at least as they related to this law-
suit-were totally intrastate.1 ' He was living his life in New York, sometimes in
the company of his children and sometimes not. Whatever indirect benefits
flowed to him from California flowed solely as the result of free exercises of
choice by his ex-wife and children. Assuming that he had no power to control
their activities and to restrict their choices, to subject him to jurisdiction as a
result of their activities and choices would be patently unfair. Assuming that he
did have the power to control their activities and to restrict their choices, to force
him to utilize that power to structure their lives in a way that would insulate him
from California's jurisdiction would be socially undesirable.216
A determination that the defendants in the Shaffer case should answer to the
claims against them in Delaware would not give rise to the same images of basic
unfairness. The defendants did, presumably voluntarily, accept positions of trust
within the Greyhound Corporation, a corporation involved in multistate activ-
ities.21 7 It is probable that their motivation was personal economic gain in one
form or another. The Greyhound Corporation is chartered under the laws of the
State of Delaware. By accepting positions with that corporation,21 8 the de-
fendants created ties between themselves and the State of Delaware. 219 Benefits
from those ties flowed to the defendants as a result of certain Delaware statutes
which created benefits for the officers and directors of "local" corporations.22 °
It seems safe to assume that most individuals accepting positions as officers or
directors are not unaware of the existence of such benefits. At least that was the
to the suit at hand." Leathers, supra note 185. While that portion of the opinion is, as has been
noted, a likely target for critical comment and while at least one Justice has conceded that "[w]e
are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final" (Jackson,
J., concurring, in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953)), it seems dangerous to simply
dismiss this portion of the opinion as an unfortunate error.
213 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). This phrase was, of course, used again
by the Supreme Court in International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
214 436 U.S. at 97. The language of the Court suggests that jurisdiction will be more often
upheld when the defendant's contacts with the forum state flow from commercial transactions.
215 436 U.S. at 97-98. Those who have argued for the abandonment of the traditional bias
favoring defendants in the law of jurisdiction have most often focused on the situation in which
the defendant, but not the plaintiff, is engaged in interstate activity. See, e.g., von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 161.
216 See note 198 supra.
217 It is difficult to assert whether or not the plaintiff in this case was involved in multi-
state activities both because in this derivative action it is unclear who the plaintiff really is and
becaus6 it is difficult to characterize the activity of one who, without ever leaving home,
acquires an ownership interest in a national corporation engaged in multistate activities.
218 Actually, some of the defendants were officers or directors of Greyhound Lines, Inc., a
California corporation. That fact was not significant, given the Court's view of the case. 433
U.S. at 213 n.41.
219 This assumes, of course, that the concept of the "state of incorporation" retains some
measure of importance under the law. Presumably, for example, there is no question today but
that the Greyhound Corporation itself would be suable in its "home state" of Delaware.
220 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 provides for interest free loans for officers and directors
and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 provides for indemnification.
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assumption of the State of Delaware, which enacted these statutes to induce
capable individuals to accept positions with its corporations.22'
In short, the majority's conclusory statement that "[a]pellants have simply
had nothing to do with the State of Delaware" '22 2 is neither grounded in reality
nor supported by the meager record in this case. If the validity of the Court's
determination depended upon the accuracy of that statement, the result in the
case could not be rationally defended. The two are not inextricably intertwined,
however. Proof that appellants did have something to do with the State of Dela-
ware would not necessarily dictate a different result. The result in Shaffer may
be explained by the fact that under the strict standard for jurisdiction being ap-
plied a great deal more than that is required.
The Court in Shaffer, again relying on Hanson, asserts that the exercise of
jurisdiction is improper unless the defendants have "purposefully avail[ed them-
selves] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State."22 It
is not enough to show that the individual defendants have benefited indirectly
from the corporation's direct ties to the forum state. It must be shown that each
defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state. The gloss which the Shaffer result puts on this rule makes
it clear that the requirements will often be difficult to meet. The particular pro-
cedures followed by the Court made it virtually impossible for the plaintiff to
make the necessary showing in Shaffer.
The minimum contacts test is, of course, a test which must be applied in
light of the facts of a given case. No one could quarrel with Mr. Justice Brennan's
characterization of the minimum contacts inquiry as one which is "highly de-
pendent on creating a proper factual foundation." '24 Such a foundation did not
exist when the Supreme Court made its minimum contacts determination in
Shaffer. This was, after all, a case that had begun as a quasi in rem action.
Quasi in rem jurisdiction had been upheld by the state courts below. There was
no real need to consider minimum contacts at that point. The Court, nonethe-
less, chose not to remand the case for a factual determination, and, unlike the
practice evidenced in some modern cases,225 construed the gaps in the record
against the plaintiff and dismissed the action. This was but one additional in-
221 Merrit-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 264 A.2d 358 (Del. Super. 1970).
222 433 U.S. at 216.
223 433 U.S. at 216 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
224 433 U.S. at 221.
225 Both state and federal courts have almost uniformly held that the party seeking to invoke
the jurisdiction of the Court bears the burden of persuasion in establishing the existence of
jurisdiction over the opposing party. See Tetco Metal Prod., Inc. v. Langham, 387 F.2d 721
(5th Cir. 1968). Therefore, once the defendant puts personal jtirisdiction in issue, generally
through a motion to dismiss, the burden of persuasion with respect to that issue rests with the
plaintiff. In recent years, however, there has been a tendency on the part of at least some
courts to hold, on the most minimal of showings, that the plaintiff has made a prima facie
showing that jurisdiction exists and that the burden of rebutting the prima facie case rests with
the defendant.
See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal. 2d 893,
458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969), a products liability case in which the court placed
upon the nonresident defendant the burden of establishing that the product had "arrived in
California in a manner so fortuitous and unforeseeable as to demonstrate that its placement
hlere was not purposeful" and that the burden to the defendant in defending this lawsuit in
California would be "significantly different in its nature and extent" than defending law-
suits which might arise out of other admittedly purposeful acts of the defendant in the state.
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dication of the new "harder line" being exhibited by the Supreme Court with
respect to jurisdictional questions. This "harder line" is likely to be converted
into a "new caution" in the lower courts.
2 26
V. Conclusion
It is possible to view the Shaffer and Kulko opinions as the products of a
somewhat schizophrenic approach to the law of state court jurisdiction. Under
this view, the Court in the first three sections of the Shaffer opinion acted in a
manner consistent with the modern trend of jurisdictional development by
eliminating the old "power over property" concepts and replacing them with a
universal concern for "fairness to people." This was accomplished by finally
breaking free from Pennoyer and by subjecting "all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction" to evaluation "according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny."2 7 In the last section of the Shaffer opinion and in Kulko,
however, the Court actually retarded this modern trend by utilizing a rather
restrictive approach in applying the minimum contacts test of International Shoe
to the facts of the cases before it.
Certainly the fact that the Court has expressed a restrictive view of minimum
contacts cannot be denied. What might have been thought to be merely an
illusion after Shaffer has become a reality that cannot be ignored after Kulko.
In each case the Court emphasized the need for significant ties between the de-
fendant and the forum state. In each case the Court paid tribute to the "purpose-
ful availment" test of Hanson v. Denckla. In each case the Court gave indica-
tions that the more "traditional" the contact the more likely that jurisdiction
would be upheld. 8 It is, therefore, possible to dwell on the basic "inconsistency"
of the opinions. On the one hand, the Court expands the influence of Interna-
tional Shoe, and, on the other, it undercuts its utility.
It is important, however, to bear in mind that every jurisdictional decision
rendered in either Shaffer or Kulko was a restrictive one. Shaffer initially limited
plaintiffs' options by taking away quasi in rem bases for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion which had been available at least since Pennoyer v. Neff and Harris v. Balk.
In part IV of Shaffer and in Kulko visible limitations were placed upon the ap-
plication of the minimum contacts test-a test which, particularly after McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co., possessed great potential as the foundation upon
which a more expansive system of jurisdiction might have been built. Viewed
this way, the two opinions are completely consistent.
The restrictive actions of the Court-both in eliminating outmoded juris-
dictional theories and in tightening the application of modern tests-suggest that
226 See, e.g., Pavlo v. James, 437 F. Supp. 125, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) where the court refused
to exercise jurisdiction, "especially in light of the new caution currently being portrayed in
measuring the constitutionality of assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in general."
227 433 U.S. at 212.
228 The first such indication comes near the beginning of part IV of the Shaffer opinion
when the Court seems to return to tests of the past in stating, "[a]ppellee Heitner did not
allege and does not now claim that appellants have ever set foot in Delaware." 433 U.S. at
213. More helpful is the Kulko opinion where the Court makes reference to causing physical
injury to either property or persons in the state or engaging in commercial transactions which
touch the state as the kind of contacts likely to give rise to jurisdiction. See 436 U.S. at 96-97.
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a crossroads has been reached in the development of the law of state court
jurisdiction. Ever since the restrictive rules of Pennoyer were announced, a major
goal has been to better equip plaintiffs to deal effectively with non-resident de-
fendants. Changes in the law have, therefore, consistently increased the permis-
sible forums within which a plaintiff might sue. The dramatic departure 'from
this pattern in Shaffer and Kulko is a strong indication that the pendulum has
swung and that, at least in the eyes of the Supreme Court, placing effective limits
on state court jurisdiction has become a new priority in this area of the law.
A shift of this sort should not have been totally unexpected. It is rare that
growth of any kind continues unabated. Jurisdictional expansion has been con-"
tinuous over the last century and has been most dramatic in the last thirty years.
That growth has not resulted in an unlimited number of potential forums for each
plaintiff in every case. It has, however, in many cases provided plaintiffs with the
opportunity to choose amongst permissible forums. A next logical step in the
evolutionary process might be the elimination of the plaintiff's choice. Fairness
might best be served if the law did not permit the plaintiff to select any forum
state which meets a "minimum contacts" test but instead required that the
plaintiff sue in the forum with the "best contacts. 229
The restrictive changes of Shaffer and Kulko, however, do not appear to be
changes of this type. To make such a shift, greater reliance would actually have
to be placed on McGee and the kind of "interest analysis" utilized by the Court
in that case. "Best contacts" cannot be assessed by looking only at the defendant's
contacts, unless a return to the days when a defendant could be sued only at home
is thought to be desirable. Both Shaffer and Kulko focus on the defendant's
contacts, minimize the importance of other considerations, and reject the notion
that jurisdiction should be made to depend upon which forum is the "center of
gravity" of the controversy.
The absence of movement toward a "best contacts" standard may be more
the result of a lack of ability than it is a lack of inclination. Throughout the
changes that have occurred in the law of jurisdiction, a constant point of reference
has been the basic premise that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment extends certain protections to defendants. The nature and extent of those
protections have varied over time. Flexibility has been achieved by loosening the
protective requirements. To suggest, however, that the fourteenth amendment
would preclude a plaintiff from suing in a state because that state did not have
the "best contacts" with the litigation, even though the defendant's due process
rights had been met, would be a marked departure from the past.
The only other alternative open to the Supreme Court would have been to
permit the period of jurisdictional expansion to continue and to rely upon the
states to impose "best contacts" limitations of their own. There is, however,
little reason to believe that states, unencumbered by constitutional concerns,
would launch a voluntary search for the forum conveniens. Certainly there has
been little in the case law of the past thirty years to support a belief that a state
court with the power to assert jurisdiction would voluntarily decline to do so,
229 An argument favoring the search for the forum conveniens is made in Ehrenzweig, supra
note 37.
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except under the most unusual circumstances. 3 ' In using the fourteenth amend-
ment to reassert its interest in protecting defendants from improper exercises of
jurisdiction, the Court used a traditional tool in a traditional way to help ensure
that future exercises of jurisdiction will at least be reasonable ones. Any drive
toward the "ideal forum," however, appears to have been stalled in the process.
230 The Court's refusal to acknovledge the link between jurisdiction and choice of law may
also betray a keener awareness of the close relationship between those two concepts than the
literal words of the opinion would suggest. The Supreme Court has not actively asserted con-
stitutional controls over the choice of law process for many years. The result has not been a
voluntary search for the "best law" but a strong tendency on the part of state courts to apply
the law of their own state.
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